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INTRODUCTION
Early in his memoir Secrets, Daniel Ellsberg recalls the moment he first
surreptitiously accessed top-secret government information, an experience
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that would lead him, ultimately, to become the most famous liberator of
classified documents in American history. Ellsberg was then a young, rising
Pentagon bureaucrat who had been hired away from his previous position
as a research analyst at Rand, a private think tank that served as a
consultant to the Pentagon's efforts fighting the Vietnam War, to work for
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.' In the course of his duties, McNaughton received
classified documents that Ellsberg lacked sufficient security clearance to
read. The binder in which those documents were filed sat on a rolling
bookstand in McNaughton's office. Every evening, the bookstand was
rolled into a secure, locked closet. Ellsberg could see the binder but was not
allowed to look inside, despite its promise of invaluable information that
could divulge the secrets of the unfolding drama in Vietnam. Ellsberg
narrates the event of one fateful evening:
It was too much for me. There came a night-I can't remember how many
weeks it was after [McNaughton] had directed my attention to this forbidden
binder-when I did pull it out of the row of files and open it.... The office
was dark; the light was coming from inside the closet. I was in the process of
putting the rolling stand away for the night. I looked inside the thick binder
and riffled through the contents. It was like opening the door on Ali Baba's
treasure.... At a glance I could see that what I held in my hand was
precious. Reading just a few paragraphs here and there was, for me, like
breathing pure oxygen. My heart was pounding.2
Witness the tension and expectation as Ellsberg-who would later
illegally release to United States newspapers what would be famously
referred to as the "Pentagon Papers"-describes the ecstasy of access and
anticipates what would soon become his troubled, infamous relationship to
secret documents. The records that he was forbidden to view almost
commanded that he view them. They offered him new, important
information, and therefore revelation-the purest form of "oxygen" an
analyst like Ellsberg requires to survive and prosper. But their access had
been strictly limited. Not only were they removed from the public, which
was ignorant of their existence, they were even kept separate from someone
like Ellsberg, a Harvard-trained wunderkind specifically hired to assist the
government agency that forbid him access. Ellsberg was forced to violate
the law that prohibited him from viewing the documents, to cross both the
legal line and physical boundary that placed this binder beyond his view.
His heroism, to those who see it as such, began when he traversed that well-
1. DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS
35-36 (2002).
2. Id. at 8 1.
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guarded (but not well-guarded enough!) threshold into the sacred space
where the most privileged information is secured. Only then could he
imagine freeing that information from its physical constraints; only then
could he imagine educating the public of the policies and actions that were
being undertaken in its name.
For Ellsberg and those committed to the expansion and strict
enforcement of open government laws, the antidote to the wrong of
excessive governmental secrecy is greater transparency. Without access to
the government, the public can neither evaluate the government's
performance in the past, nor hold the government accountable in the
present, nor deliberate over the government's future representatives or
policies.3 As Ellsberg's description vividly reveals, transparency suggests
both visibility-these documents exist, and powerful government officials
can see them-and a distance that makes that visibility difficult to
achieve-you can't see them, and you don't even know they exist. The
young bureaucrat would only become the (in)famous Daniel Ellsberg by
allowing the public to view the information that was kept secret and secure.
When applied as a foundational concept for federal and state
administrative laws mandating some form of open government,
transparency assumes the existence of a gap that arises naturally between
the state and its public. Its underlying logic works as follows. Government
institutions operate at a distance from those they serve. To be held
accountable and to perform well, the institutions must be visible to the
public. But in the normal course of their bureaucratic operation, public
organizations-sometimes inadvertently, sometimes willfully; sometimes
with good intent, sometimes with unethical or illegal intent-create
institutional impediments that obstruct external observation. These
3. See Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (declaring that
Congress's clear intent in enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)), was "to pierce the veil of
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny" (quoting
Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974))); Common Cause v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that Congress's
purpose in enacting the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241
(1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)), was "to make government more
fully accountable to the people"); Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive,
and the Lgitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 108 (2010) ("The
essence of accountability lies in the transparency of government actions, the public's
capacity to insist on justifications for the exercise of power, and arrangements that subject
officials to discipline when justifications for their actions fall short."); Senator Richard
Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARv.J.
ON LEGIs. 369, 370 (2000) ("Transparency and accountability in government are two
principles crucial to securing the public trust.").
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obstructions must be removed in order for the institutions to be visible and,
ultimately, transparent. The dictionary definition of the word transparency
makes this dynamic plain: something that is transparent has "the property
of transmitting light, so as to render bodies lying beyond completely visible;
that can be seen through ... ."4 A transparent window, for example,
enables one to see inside from outside or vice versa, rendering visible to
each other those that are on either side, despite their separation.5
Employed in this way, the term transparency simultaneously describes both
an aspirational goal-full openness to the public-and the core problem
that must be overcome in order for that goal to be met-the separation
between the state and public. Judges, policy advocates, academics, and
legislatures frequently deploy the concept's metaphorical authority when
adjudicating, advocating, and legislating transparency. "Democracies die
behind closed doors," a federal appellate court declared when finding that
the First Amendment prohibits the government from closing immigration
hearings to the public and press without an individualized showing of
justification.6 "Sunlight" or "sunshine," when it is allowed to shine through
previously darkened, secretive places, provides the best of "disinfectants,"
Louis Brandeis famously contended when he decried the corrupt trusts of
the early twentieth century.7  Information must be set free from its
bureaucratic constraints, as Congress declared in the name of its act
requiring executive branch agencies to disclose information.8  Deep
secrets-those state secrets that the public does not know that it does not
4. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 419 (2d ed. 1989).
5. The same dynamic exists even when a commentator complicates the concept by
substituting "translucent" for "transparency" in recognizing the inevitable limitations on
public access to government information. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets,
Constitutional Law, and Playforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REv. 909, 923, 969-76
(2006).
6. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). The quotation
almost immediately inspired the titles of two law review articles. See Lauren Gilbert, When
Democracy Dies Behind Closed Doors: The First Amendment and "Special Interest" Hearings, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (2003); Rena Steinzor, "Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors": The
Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641 (2003); see also
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 798 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The
Government in the Sunshine Act embodies the general policy that federal agencies should
'conduct their meetings in the open, rather than behind closed doors."' (quoting S. REP. No.
94-354, at 1 (1975))).
7. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEoPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Augustus M. Kelley 1986) (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman."); see also infra note 28 (identifying the influence this
metaphor has on legal academic writings).
8. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
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know because they are hidden below the public's view-pose the greatest
danger in liberal constitutional democracy, two important recent law
review articles have persuasively argued.9 Transparency thus serves as
more than a mere technical concept that provides the basis for
constitutional, legislative, and regulatory rules. It also acts as a powerful
metaphor that drives and shapes the desire for a more perfect democratic
order.
Ideally, of course, there would be no distance between observer and
observed, between the governed and those institutions that govern. The
metaphor, in other words, would accurately diagnose the problem and set
an agenda for the cure. Under a strong form of transparency, government
doors should never be closed; government should not operate in the
darkness; all government information should be available to the public; and
in the rare instance when they must be kept from the public, government
secrets should not be so deep that their existence is unknown.'o How else
can citizens make up their minds independently of government officials and
media gatekeepers, and advise elected officials as to the wisest course of
action? A weaker conception of transparency concedes the need to balance
transparency's beneficial effects and normative value against the state's
need to withhold a limited amount of information whose disclosure would
cause identifiable harm." As a metaphor, transparency suggests two
solutions: allow the public to view the state directly, or require the state to
make its work available for the public to review. Open government laws
rely on both of these solutions by requiring certain government entities to
hold open meetings, trials, and deliberations,12 and by mandating that
9. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REv. 257, 289-93, 305-25 (2010); Heidi
Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REv. 489, 514-
15, 542-43 (2007).
10. The most vocal proponents of transparency in its strongest form are journalists and
open government advocates. See, e.g., National Freedom of Information Coalition, About
NFOIC, Bylaws, http://www.nfoic.org/about (last visited Aug. 5, 2010) (describing the
group as "a nonpartisan alliance of citizen-driven nonprofit freedom of information
organizations, academic and First Amendment centers, journalistic societies and attorneys");
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Information Resources,
http://www.rcfp.org/foia/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2010) (describing the organization as "the
nation's leading advocate for open government issues on behalf ofjournalists").
11. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 910-14 (2006)
(describing the balance between benefits and limitations in conceptions of transparency).
12. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)) (establishing open meeting requirements for
federal administrative agencies); Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 11120-11132 (West 2005) (establishing open meeting requirements for California public
agencies).
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government records be made public routinely or in response to a public
request.1 3 Both the strong and weak conceptions of transparency assert that
the legal order imposed by such laws-and other efforts by the state, urged
on by the public, to impose openness-can unveil the state, eradicating or
at least mitigating its distance from its citizens through mandates and
obligations placed on government institutions and officials.
And yet, the regular, ritualistic outpouring of public complaints about
the weakness of such laws and the power and dangers of a secretive
government suggests that transparency's metaphorical ideal in fact does not
prevail.14 The state remains distant and unseen, perhaps even concealed.
In an earlier article, I explored the conceptual reasons why this
disappointment seems endemic to transparency. 5 In this article, I explain
how transparency's metaphoric dimensions-the problem it identifies and
the goal it sets-impede our ability to understand and address the
complexities of the modern administrative state.
The public prefers a proximate, comprehensible, responsive
bureaucracy, one that fulfills the "democratic wish" of a directly
accountable government.16 Populist and progressive reforms and political
campaigns endeavor to take the nation back from the present crisis caused
by an autocratic, secretive "other" ensconced in Washington and state
capitols.' 7  They promise that by revealing the state's operations,
transparency's metaphoric understanding can enable the public to control
the state. The transparency movement, which came of age as part of what
Richard Stewart called the "reformation" of American administrative law
in the 1970s and after, suggests that the state must and can be made
visible.18
Administrative reform cannot, however, deliver on transparency's
metaphoric promise. The state's large, organizationally and physically
dispersed public bureaucracies perform a variety of functions and make a
staggering number of decisions of varying importance, not all of which can
13. See, e.g., FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (establishing disclosure requirements for federal
administrative agencies); California Public Records Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 6250-
6276.48 (West 2008) (establishing disclosure requirements for California public agencies).
14. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom ofInformation Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1014-15 & nn.9-12 (2008) (summarizing and collecting recent
commentaries decrying the current state of open government laws).
15. See generally Fenster, supra note 11.
16. JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (rev. ed., Yale University Press 1998).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 36-47.




be viewed before the fact or even easily reviewed later. The state is too big,
too remote, and too enclosed to be completely visible. The very nature of
the state, in other words, creates the conditions of its obscurity. It can
never be fully transparent, at least not in the sense that the term and its
populist suspicions of the state require. Overinvestment in transparency as
a metaphor leads open government advocates to lament insufficiently
effective administrative laws, while the debate over how best to make the
government open too often focuses on how to make the state permanently
and entirely visible rather than on devising means to improve public
oversight and education.19  Transparency's fear of a secret, remote
government-like its promise of a visible, accessible one-heightens the
concept's salience even as it obscures the limits of its enforceability as an
administrative norm.
Transparency is a means to achieve the end of a more responsive state
that more effectively achieves democratically agreed-upon ends.
Transparency's symbolic pull, its ability to grab the public's imagination,
leads us to fetishize means at the cost of ends. 20 My underlying assumption
is that bureaucracy is necessary to carry out the tasks required in a complex
society and economy. As the public administration scholar Donald Kettl
has argued, "society has yet to discover anything that works better in
coordinating complex action" than public bureaucracies. 21 The public
must certainly know about the government's operations, but obtaining that
knowledge is not a costless transaction. Simplistic understandings of the
state's operations and the potential of imposing equally simplistic
19. Cf Cary Coglianese, The Transpareng President? The Obama Administration and Open
Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 537 (2009) (distinguishing between "fishbowl"
transparency, which focuses on the maximal release of government data, and "reasoned"
transparency, which more effectively requires government officials to provide "sound
reasons for their decisions"); Mark Schmitt, Transpareng for What?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.
2010, at A10 (criticizing efforts to require the release of government data and praising
legislative enactments that instead focus on increasing public understanding).
20. See Fenster, supra note 11, at 941; see also Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency: The
Perils of Openness in Government, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 2009, at 37 (questioning the likely
consequences of what he describes as the "naked transparency movement"); William J.
Stuntz, Secret Service: The Liberal Case Against Individual Privacy and Government Transparency, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2006, at 12, 14 ("Transparency makes politics a running argument
about decision-making, not about decisions.").
21. Donald F. Kettl, Public Bureaucracies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONs 366, 373 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006); see also Kenneth J. Meier &
Gregory C. Hill, Bureaucracy in the Twenty-First Centuy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIc MANAGEMENT 51, 51 (Ewan Ferlie et al. eds., 2005) ("[L]arge-scale tasks that
government must perform .. . will remain key functions of governments in the twenty-first
century and . . . bureaucracies, likely public but possibly private, will continue to be the most
effective way to do these tasks.").
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understandings of transparency can lead to imperfect, costly measures to
disclose information and less effective governance.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores transparency's
metaphoric work within American law, politics, and culture, and identifies
its dual role as both a powerful, populist metaphor and a set of imperfect
technocratic tools. It introduces the argument that Parts II and III then
develop: transparency's obsessive concern with visibility and the effort that
this concern inspires to contain the state ultimately fail and disappoint
because of the state's inevitable organizational and geographic distance
from the public. The technocratic tools of open government cannot in fact
meet the demands that transparency's force as a political and
administrative symbol animates. Part II focuses on the state's
organizational complexity, both as a matter of form and function, and
describes the various constitutional and statutory mechanisms that
simultaneously establish an intricate institutional network and impose a
limited, variable set of transparency commands. Part III describes the
physical impediments to transparency caused by the vast territory of the
American state, the complexity of its jurisdictional units, and the physical
structures that house government offices. Both Parts II and III explain the
impediments to the state's visibility and the imperfect means that have been
developed to overcome them.
A final, concluding part posits that the ultimate technocratic tool that
could successfully contain the state and make it visible would reverse
Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, rendering the state a prisoner of the public's
gaze. The impossibility of this solution demonstrates the limits of
transparency as a symbol and suggests that the way forward is to
understand transparency's limited usefulness as a term for achieving both
an effective and accessible state. Nevertheless, this Article concludes,
transparency's prevalence as a political concept requires reform efforts to
balance delicately technocratic efficacy with populist demands.
I. TRANSPARENCY AS POPULIST METAPHOR
A. Transparency as Metaphor
Among other things, Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign
pledged to reverse the Bush administration's penchant for secrecy and its
general opposition to transparency norms, proclaiming on its campaign
website that if elected Obama would "Shine the Light on Washington
Lobbying" as well as on federal contracts, tax breaks, and earmarks, and
624 [62:3
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"Bring Americans Back into their Government."2 2 Although it is difficult to
ascertain what role Obama's transparency pledge played in his victory, it
was one among many issues that constituted his campaign's narrative of
Obama as an agent of change.23  Obama's message was not an
idiosyncratic one. The Democratic Party's 1976 campaign platform, when
Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the first post-Watergate presidential
election, offered quite similar calls for "responsive" and "competent"
government that would end the "remote government" whose "secretive and
unresponsive" approach the Nixon-Ford presidency had established.24
Both campaigns featured self-proclaimed outsiders who touted their
promises to reform a corrupt and secretive Washington and to make
government accessible and visible to the public. Elect me and you will have
your government back, their campaigns vowed. Underlying this partisan
political discourse are the notions that the government you fear operates
behind a veil of secrecy while the government you want operates in the
open, and that no amount of secrecy is warranted while no amount of
transparency is too great. These campaigns described a fallen world in
which the state is remote and apart from its citizenry, operating corruptly
and out of the public's view. At the same time, they promised a
government that would be close, visible, trustworthy, and transparent.
Such rhetoric is in fact quite common when an organization or writer
advocates on behalf of transparency. "America is a nation of secrets," one
22. BarackObama.com, Ethics, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/
indcx-campaign.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2010). See Coglianese, supra note 19, at 533
(describing how, "[a]s a candidate, Obama had clearly signaled his support of open
government reforms").
23. Indeed, soon after taking office, President Obama declared in an official
memorandum published in the Federal Register that his "Administration is committed to
creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government." Memorandum from
President Barack Obama on Transparency and Open Government to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/transparency-and-open-
government.
24. DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM OF 1976, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=29606 (last visited Aug. 5, 2010). John McCain's 2008 campaign and the
Republican Party's 2008 platform also promised transparency, but the former focused more
on campaign finance and the latter focused on the budget process and earmarks. See Klaus
Marre, McCain Vows Unprecedented Transparency, THE HILL, May 15, 2008,
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/ 1356-mccain-vows-unprecedented-transparency-
2008-05-15.html; Posting of Laura Meckler to Washington Wire, McCain Promises
Transparency, Accountability, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/
05/15/mccain-promises-transparency-accountability/ (May 15, 2008, 06:00 EST); 2008
REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=78545 (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
20 10] 625
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recent popular book warns, "an increasingly furtive land where closed
doors outnumber open ones ... ."25 A large, international network of
nongovernmental organizations that seek to expand public rights to
information attempt to aid journalists and members of the public by
pressuring governments to "free" information, operate in the open and in
the sunshine, and make government data constantly and immediately
available on an on-demand, real-time basis. 26 The image pervades the
academic literature on transparency as well, with definitions and
introductory sections that imaginatively and provocatively present the
government as a closed, isolated entity with shuttered windows and locked
doors. One academic definition of transparency states that the term "refers
to the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables
them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions
made by insiders." 27 Following Brandeis's dictum, hundreds of law review
articles assert that "sunlight" offers a solution that can "disinfect" bad
government and corruption.28  Some authors cast information as a
substance that in a proper democracy must flow freely out of the
government's clutches and into the waiting arms of the public.29
25. TED GuP, NATION OF SECRETs 9 (2007).
26. See Judicial Watch, Our Programs, http://www.judicialwatch.org/programs (last
visited Aug. 5, 2010); OpenTheGovernment.org, Statement of Values,
http://www.openthegovemment.org/article/subarchive/63 (last visited Aug. 5, 2010);
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 10; Soc'y of Professional Journalists,
Project Sunshine, http://www.spj.org/sunshine.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); Sunlight
Foundation, About the Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last
visited Aug. 5, 2010).
27. Ann Florini, Introduction: The Battle Over Transparency, in THE RIGHT TO KNOw:
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 1, 5 (Ann Florini ed., 2007).
28. See, e.g., Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 399, 399 (2009) ("[S]unlight in the form of robust public access to government
information is essential to the vitality of democratic governance."); Rebecca M. Bratspies,
Regulatoy Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 622-23 (2009) (quoting Brandeis to begin a section
arguing in favor of a strong conception of transparency as a means to create greater trust in
regulators); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1197, 1212-13 (1999) (using the Brandeis quote, noting his
importance in the development of securities laws, and arguing the SEC should require
expanded disclosures); Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1273, 1273
(1963) (deploying the Brandeis quote as epigraph). A Westlaw search on April 19, 2010, in
the Journals and Law Reviews database for articles that include the terms "sunlight" and
"disinfectant" in the same sentence found 552 documents.
29. See, e.g., Aftergood, supra note 28, at 399 ("[T]he free flow of information to
interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the deliberative
process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable."); Michael Herz, Law Lags
Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHics J.
577 (2009) (arguing for the relevance of understanding information as needing to be free as
626 [62:3
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Compare this rhetoric to the far more fanciful depictions of a corrupt,
secretive state in popular culture, which vividly and imaginatively harness
the same imagery for dramatic effect. The dinouement of the first season of
The X-Files reveals the locked Pentagon repository where the government
sequesters the most prized, awful secrets from an ignorant public-the files
that contain evidence of alien life and government conspiracy and that sit
locked in a secured vault, accessible only to the few perfidious bureaucrats
that know of the vault's existence.30 The film adaptation of All the President's
Men memorably depicts the only place where the intrepid Woodward and
Bernstein can obtain crucial government information about the illegal
activities of the Nixon White House: the dark, obscure garage where they
meet their anonymous source, Deep Throat. In one famous scene, the
reporters sift through a huge stack of paper slips in order to find evidence of
the administration's malfeasance. The camera tracks steadily upward
towards the library's very high ceiling in a shot that captures the plight of
two private citizens who attempt, against all odds, to pierce the
informational haze that a complex but coordinated state can create. They
are small and insignificant, forced to piece together a crucial story from
obscure bits of evidence made only partially available, if at all, within the
state's cavernous, intimidating architecture.3'
The series of paired terms upon which transparency proponents and
filmmakers rely-open and closed, transparent and secret, sunshine and
darkness, inside and outside, and the like-works powerfully and
metaphorically to give some normative, symbolic bite to an administrative
norm. Films and television shows, political campaigns, and popular
political discourse generally present secrecy and conspiracy as political
commonplace, and suggest that the lone individual-as in Daniel Ellsberg's
leak of the Pentagon Papers and Woodward and Bernstein's reporting on
what became known as the Watergate scandal32-must save us from official
corruption and perfidy.33 Indeed, the political reforms that followed the
Vietnam War and Watergate depended in part on popular disgust with
government secrets,34 as well as on Ellsberg's and Woodward and
part of open government obligations); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and
Beyond- Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95,
167 (2004) (decrying government's tendency to "seal off information at its source").
30. The X-Files: The Erlenmeyer Flask (Fox Television broadcast May 13, 1994).
31. ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976).
32. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
33. ELLSBERG, supra note 1; DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A
HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 33-47 (1996).
34. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO
KNow: THE ORIGINS AND APPUCATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 46-48
2010] 627
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Bernstein's deification as heroic actors exposing government deceitfulness
and treachery.35
Transparency thus operates simultaneously in two ways. It constitutes a
technical concept that, when properly implemented in law and regulation,
produces goods deemed essential for a democratic society: an effective
administrative state; a knowledgeable citizenry that can hold the
government accountable; and an active, deliberative polis.36 In
implementing this understanding of the concept, constitutions and
legislatures impose transparency through legal and administrative
commands and institutional design, all of which require the intricate
drafting of provisions and the delicate balancing of interests. At the same
time, transparency also offers a highly charged metaphor of a corrupt,
secretive state that must be made visible. The metaphoric understanding of
transparency animates deeply held beliefs about the state's legitimacy,
escalating to the level of a preeminent democratic imperative the
technocratic legal issue of how best to make the official administrative
bureaucracy accessible.
B. Transparency and the Democratic Wish
Transparency's two understandings, the technical or technocratic and
the metaphorical, can work to mutual advantage. The Obama
administration, for example, is attempting to meet the vivid rhetorical
promises made in the Obama campaign with bureaucratic and
technological reforms-small bore, technocratic efforts to change the
bureaucratic culture of the federal government and to make government
data more easily accessible.37 But they can also conflict. Each time the
Obama administration has failed to take the most pro-transparency
positions-on state secrets, photos of prisoners taken at the Abu Ghraib
prison, and congressional negotiations over health care reform legislation,
for example-critics from various points on the political spectrum have
(1999).
35. See Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword: Is the Pendulum Swinging Away from Freedom
ofInformation?, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 311, 311-12 (1981); Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress,
the Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARv. L. REv. 906, 908-09 (1990).
36. See Fenster, supra note 11, at 895-902.
37. See Memorandum from Peter Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, on
Open Government Directive to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, (Dec. 8,
2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda.2010/ml0-06.pdf
(announcing the directive to federal agencies to increase government information available
online, improve the quality of government information, and "create and institutionalize a
culture of open government"); see also Coglianese, supra note 19, at 533-35 (describing the
Obama administration's early efforts to expand transparency).
628 [62:3
TRANSPARENCYAS METAPHOR
asserted that the President has failed to meet his campaign promises.38 In
such instances, the metaphorical understanding of transparency
overwhelms its technocratic understanding by creating a set of expectations
that legal and regulatory reforms cannot fulfill. By invoking transparency's
symbolic meanings, a candidate or political movement may fire a drive for
comprehensive solutions that rejects or minimizes the importance of
technical, incremental efforts and that will accept nothing less than a
perfectly accessible and visible state. Even as it reforms executive branch
compliance with open government laws and norms, the Obama
administration will continually frustrate transparency advocates, leftist
reformers skeptical of the administration's centrism, and conservative
political opponents who characterize every refusal to disclose information
or open government as another victory by a closed, secretive bureaucracy
over the people's will.
The paired terms upon which transparency relies thus establish openness
as a metonym for democracy-an element of a representative government
that appears to stand for its entirety. An engaged, informed populace can
control a transparent state, but a distant, secretive bureaucracy rules the
nontransparent state. In this sense, transparency offers a deeply populist
account of politics and the administrative state in which an unresponsive
state can and ultimately will obstruct and oppose inquisitive private
individuals. 39 By "populist," I mean both the historical populist movements
in the United States and, more particularly, the populist rhetoric and logic
that suffuse American politics. 40 Populism simplifies complex political
38. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Obama and Transparency: Judge for rourself SALON.COM,
June 17, 2009, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn-greenwald/2009/06/
17 /transparency/ (collecting and endorsing criticisms from the left); Michael Isikoff, Obama
Closes Doors on Openness, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 2009, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/202875 (criticisms from a mainstream periodical); Editorial,
Health-Care Secrets, WALL ST.J., Aug. 29-30, 2009, at A12 (editorial criticism from the right).
39. I leave aside for purposes of this Article the precise nature of the historical
relationship between populism and transparency's metaphoric understanding and whether,
for example, it represents an aspect of what historian Richard Hofstadter described as the
"paranoid style" in American politics, or whether it is a more recent and more rational
response to the expansion of the executive branch since the Great Depression and especially
following World War II. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN
PouTIcs (2d prtg., Alfred A. Knopf 1966). My purpose here is merely to note the
relationship and to assert that the rhetoric of strong-form transparency advocacy and that
implied by the term's underlying metaphor clearly align with the rhetoric of American
populism.
40. On populism as a flexible, rhetorical mode of persuasion in politics as well as an
historical survey of populist movements, see generally MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST
PERSUASION (1995). On the populist logic in American political culture, see MARK
FENSTER, CONSPIRACY THEORIES: SECRECY AND POWER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 84-89
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alignments and issues within a stark, symbolic dichotomy between "the
people" at one pole and "the other"-the power bloc in charge-at the
absolute opposite. 41 Populist appeals identify threats to the national identity
and claim to speak on behalf of an identifiable collective "we," a people
who are rising up to challenge and resist the concentrated interests that
hold power and the seemingly dangerous ideas and values those interests
represent.42 Populism drifts left and right, with no necessary connection
either to an institutional party or ideology. It can appear conservative (in
the anticommunism of the 1950s and early 1960s), liberal (in the New Deal
of the 1930s), or thoroughly independent (in the Populist campaigns of the
late nineteenth century)-in each instance it identifies some concentration
and combination of state and private power that threatens the people.43
Populism plays a recurring role in the inevitable fight over the
institutional processes of democratic political and social order.44 Because
democratic representational politics relies on a gap between the public and
its elected representatives that is mediated by established political
institutions, populist rhetoric claims to offer some more direct or authentic
means of representation in the name of the people when those institutions
appear illegitimate, whether as a result of substantive or procedural
irregularities.45 As Jack Balkin has explained, populist approaches to law
and government commit to two basic preferences: popular participation
and regular rotations of authority and power.46 Each preference envisions
a state that is proximate and thoroughly visible to the citizens that control
it. Thus, self-proclaimed populist or popular constitutional theorists in the
legal academy embrace a vision of the constitutional order that they claim
would prove more responsive to the popular will and less capable of elite
manipulation.4 7
(rev. and updated ed. 2008).
41. See ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 18 (2005).
42. Margaret Canovan, Tmst the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, 47 POL.
STUD. 2, 4-5 (1999).
43. KAZIN, supra note 40, at 192-93.
44. Cf BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF PoIIcs 3,
15 (1993) (describing the "perpetual contest" and unending resistance that mark politics).
45. Francisco Panizza, Introduction, in POPULISM AND THE MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY 1,
14 (Francisco Panizza ed., 2005).
46. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J.
1935, 1945 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993)).
47. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONsTITuTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONsTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). For a summary and critique of popular
constitutionalism, see Doni Gewirtzman, Gloy Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the
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Critics or skeptics of populism, especially those tied to what Balkin has
called the progressive category or strain of public law, decry the retrograde
and conservative implications of understanding the complex contemporary
state in such simplistic terms.48  For progressives committed to the
regulatory intervention into market activity provided by the administrative
state, the government cannot rely on direct democratic rule, but must
instead utilize expert, public agencies that deliberate rationally and are
protected from direct political control and popular sentiment.4 9 Populist
ideals can thus constitute a barrier to good, progressive governance. In
Edward Rubin's terms, they rely on an inherited set of symbols and
metaphors that "produce a sense of dissonance or incongruity, a grinding of
intellectual gears, when applied to a modem administrative state."50 The
progressivism of the regulatory state supports open government, but as a
tool for improved governance rather than as a democratic end in itself.5 1
Transparency thus operates somewhat uneasily and ironically at the
conjunction of legal and political populism and progressivism. Its populism
pursues what James Morone has called the "democratic wish" for direct
democracy, consensus, and localism that generates and assembles a popular
will to create a more perfectly accessible and instrumental state.52 Its
mobilization around the ideal of the visible state proceeds restlessly and
endlessly, driven by the unsatisfactory nature of the corrupt present. At the
True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. LJ. 897 (2005).
48. Balkin, supra note 46, at 1946-47.
49. See Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 95, 96-98 (2003). This debate is merely another instance of the
longstanding struggle over the administrative state's legitimacy, one that began in the United
States in earnest during the New Deal era, when progressive academics engaged in battle
with conservatives fearful of an unaccountable and unconstitutional executive branch. See
Mark Fenster, The Birth of a "Lgical System": Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern
Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REv. 69, 80-91 (2005).
50. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITIcs AND LAW FOR THE
MODERN STATE 13 (2005).
51. See id. at 140 (noting criticisms of various federal open government laws, but
ultimately approving of them as means by which administrative agencies interact with the
public); see also infra notes 142-45 (discussing ambivalence of "new public governance"
scholars towards transparency). Political leftists and progressives may espouse a strong
commitment to transparency. See, e.g., Ellen Miller, Obama at One, NATION, Feb. 1, 2010, at
21 (contribution by the Sunlight Foundation Executive Director to a progressive magazine's
forum both praising and criticizing Obama's record on transparency in his first year in
office); Greenwald, supra note 38 (leftist writer condemning Obama's poor commitment to
transparency). In doing so, they espouse a left populism analogous to that of the popular
constitutional theorists identified above, many of whom would also identify themselves as
progressives or leftists. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. MORONE, supra note 16, at 5-9.
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same time, its progressive cast-its commitment to legal rules and
institutions that can constrain the state and make it visible-attempts to
address and manage popular discontent through a bureaucratic apparatus,
one that has grown steadily at the federal, state, and local levels since the
nation's founding. The state's bureaucratic apparatus executes legal rules
and regulations and is itself controlled by an evolving and expanding set of
laws.
This produces a cyclical, ironic dynamic: the populist demand for
popular control of the state in turn leads to a more expansive state that in
turn creates a larger bureaucratic organization that in turn leads to calls for
more popular control. The Jacksonian era illustrates this dynamic quite
well. Swept into power on a wave of populist sentiment that sought to
wrest power away from what they characterized as a ruling Federalist elite
and replace it with egalitarian, popular control of the state,53 Andrew
Jackson and Jacksonian Democrats remade and expanded the federal
bureaucracy, recasting the emerging American bureaucracy as one based
on offices and rules rather than individuals and privilege.54 In this instance
and others throughout American political and administrative history, the
effort to make the state more accessible and accountable to the people also
has led to an expanded administrative state.55 The narrower contemporary
populist call to create a more visible state creates a similar dynamic. Forced
to impose its will on a complex, decentralized set of governmental
institutions created to meet its citizens' substantive demands for public
goods, benefits, and regulatory programs, efforts to create a more open
government must rely on complex combinations of procedural laws,
regulations, and institutions. The democratic wish for transparency may
(or may not) lead to a more visible state, but it will certainly produce more
of the state to make visible.
C. The Impossibility of Transparency
As a result of the populist dynamic that at once fears and expands the
state, transparency has proven and will continue to prove impossible to
achieve as an administrative norm in its strongest, metaphorical form.
53. See MORTON KELLER, AMERICA'S THREE REGIMES: A NEW PouTicAL HISTORY
67-200 (2007); SEAN WILENTZ, ANDREWJACKSON 6 (2005).
54. See MORONE, supra note 16, at 92-94; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and "The
Democracy": Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1583-
84 (2008).
55. See MORONE, supra note 16, at 11-13; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal




From its beginnings, the new United States faced a dire organizational
problem: how and whether to create a federal government out of a
disparate set of colonies spread over a large territory while still addressing
the popular demand for a direct, accessible government. The effort to do
so spawned anxious commentary from proponents of the new constitution
and angry condemnations by their critics. In The Federalist Number 37, James
Madison worried about the "arduous" task facing the constitutional
convention in "marking the proper line of partition between the authority
of the general and that of the State governments," and suggested that the
issue was so complex, and its solution so difficult to derive, that the resulting
lines drawn in the constitutional convention were the necessary result of
human estimation and political compromise.56  The Anti-Federalists,
meanwhile, characterized the task as impossible rather than merely
arduous, and dismissed the resulting constitution as fatally flawed. Writing
as Cato in The New-York Journal in 1787 (in a letter later collected as part of
The Antifederalist Papers), New York Governor George Clinton warned
against the "consolidation or union" of states that comprise an "immense
extent of territory" "into one great whole":
[W]hat can you promise yourselves, on the score of consolidation of the
United States into one government? Impracticability in the just exercise of it,
your freedom insecure, even this form of government limited in its
continuance, the employments of your country disposed of to the opulent, to
whose contumely you will continually be an object. You must risk much, by
indispensably placing trusts of the greatest magnitude, into the hands of
individuals whose ambition for power, and aggrandizement, will oppress and
grind you. Where, from the vast extent of your territory, and the
complication of interests, the science of government will become intricate
and perplexed, and too mysterious for you to understand and observe; and
by which you are to be conducted into a monarchy, either limited or
despotic; the latter, Mr. Locke remarks, is a government derived frorn neither nature
nor compact.57
In response to such arguments, Alexander Hamilton conceded that those
who lived closer to the seat of power would enjoy greater access to the state
than those who lived far away, but he argued that the proper institutional
design of government, combined with the development of an active civil
society and independent press, would produce a functional, accountable
state.58 The Hamiltonian belief that organization can correct the structural
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227-31 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
57. THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No. 14, at 36-38 (George Clinton) (Morton Borden
ed., 1965).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 56, at 516-17 (Alexander Hamilton); cf THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 56, at 83 (James Madison) (arguing that a republic
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problems caused by a large territory and complex federal system has
remained prevalent throughout the twentieth century, most notably in
repeated efforts to reorganize and tame what are seen as fragmented,
haphazardly structured executive branches of both the federal and state
governments.59 Bureaucratic organization has its "ups and downs" in
modern democracies, in organizational theoristJohan Olsen's terms, but its
hold remains "tenacious" and its history marked by theoretical and political
arguments over how best to design institutions and rules that might
improve or perfect governmental operations.60
These anxieties and arguments about the state originate in two distinct
obstructions to the public's ability to view it. The first barrier is
organizational. If, in Madison's terms, it has proven difficult to draw lines
among the various levels and agents of government that wield state
authority, then, in the Anti-Federalists' terms, the state will appear
"intricate and perplexed, and too mysterious" to monitor.61 Visibility
requires simplicity because complexity creates opacity. The second barrier
is spatial. Hamilton argued that the state could manage its offices and
officers across vast distances through the formal and informal relationships
among federal, state, and local governments, and by the diligent work of an
alert press and public. He assumed that a complex organization of
governmental institutions and civil society would develop, built in large part
on the public's agents in the press and federal and state capitals that would
promote the national and public interest. The Anti-Federalists, by contrast,
predicted that the vast post-colonial territory-itself having a small
footprint compared to the current United States-would frustrate the
encompassing a larger territory, and therefore a larger population, would include more
distinct parties and interests that would result in more factions that would check each other's
tendency to dominate).
59. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF
THE COMMITrEE 40-41 (1937); see also Thomas H. Stanton, Executive Organization and
Management After September 11, 2001, in MAKING GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE, at xvii, xviii-
xix (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds., 2004) (more recent complaint about the
executive branch's disorganization). On the cyclical, seemingly endless efforts to reorganize
the federal government, see PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM: MAKING
GOVERNMENT WORK, 1945-1995 (1997); JAMEs L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND
RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 52-55 (1981); and Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and
Regulatory Reform- Studies in the Neglect and Abuse ofAdministrative Law, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 405,
406-08 (1996). On the long history of state government reform, see JAMES L. GARNETT,
REORGANIZING STATE GOVERNMENT: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1980); and Jeffrey L.
Brudney et al., Reinventing Government in the American States: Measuring and Explaining Administrative
Reform, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 19 (1999).
60. Johan P. Olsen, The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization, 11 ANN. REV. POL.
Scl. 13, 27 (2008).
61. THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No. 14, supra note 57, at 37 (George Clinton).
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development of a functional national government and cohesive civil society.
If transparency abhors the distance between the state and public and
requires immediacy, then efforts to make the government's operations fully
visible must overcome the organizational and spatial distances that arise
naturally from the size and complexity of the American state. Writing in
the early twentieth century, Max Weber predicted the development of this
conflict between an expanding territory and state on the one hand and the
populist American desire for an accessible government on the other. "It is
obvious," Weber declared, "that technically the large modern state is
absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis. The larger the state, and
the more it is a great power, the more unconditionally is this the case."6 2
He foresaw that the United States, which was then "not fully
bureaucratized," would likely become so as the nation faced
"greater ... zones of friction with the outside and ... more
urgent ... needs for administrative unity at home." 63 The relatively young
nation's expanding size-both in population and space-would propel the
American state from a relatively small, directly accountable democracy
toward becoming the administrative state required to perform the functions
citizens demand.64
Thus would the government bureaucracy, a key element of what Weber
famously characterized as the antidemocratic, authoritarian, and
instrumental rationality of modernity's "iron cage," enmesh the United
States.6 5 Its vastly expanded administrative apparatus, which collects and
preserves vast quantities of data in its everyday operation, would take
advantage of the informational asymmetry that bureaucracies typically
enjoy over the public. 66 "Bureaucratic administration," Weber wrote,
"means fundamentally domination through knowledge"-domination
made possible by the bureaucracy's ability to hoard knowledge and keep its
intentions secret.6 7 To the extent that a state's large territory dictates a
larger and more powerful administrative apparatus, then, a state the size of
the United States, with its necessary bureaucratic rule, would inevitably
attempt to protect itself from the public's view. It would, in sum, make
62. 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 971 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 949-52 (discussing the limits of direct democracy).
65. See MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 178-81
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958); Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal
Rationality, or Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal
Thought, 55 HASTINGS LJ. 1031, 1056-58 (2004); Rubin, supra note 49, at 149-50.
66. See 1 WEBER, supra note 62, at 218-23.
67. Id. at 225; 3 WEBER, supra note 62, at 992.
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transparency an impossible goal to attain.
Parts II and III explore these organizational and territorial issues in
greater detail and identify the variable, imperfect measures developed in an
effort to make the state visible. They assert that the vast territory of the
United States, along with its citizenry's expectations of both an expansive
but also accessible and accountable government, have increased the
demand for transparency even as they have made it more difficult to meet.
II. EXPOSING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATE
As a result of its framers' quite conscious intent, the United States
Constitution inaugurated a prototypically modern, complex organization.
It sets forth in its articles a range of roles (legislator, executive,
administrator, judge) and institutions that would shape the behaviors of
those who would assume official positions, simply by virtue of the
organizational scheme. 68 Contemporary government agencies, many of
them subject to additional organizational mandates by their state
constitutions, 69 carry on this tradition. Their official organizational charts
graphically represent how they delegate their institutional authority and
tasks, 70 again under the assumption that the correct organization and
hierarchy will produce the correct official behavior, which will in turn result
in the optimal kind and extent of governance.7' If linked together, all such
governmental charts-those of the co-equal branches of the federal
government and their agencies, committees, and respective hierarchies, as
well as of state governments and their multitudinous municipal
governments and administrative agencies-constitute a formal atlas of
American government, a great chain of the state's being.
Such maps seem to inscribe a spatial logic that plots the division of labor
and allocates authority within units and positions. As the maps expand and
proliferate-down within branches of a particular level of government, and
across federal, state, and local levels-they seem to form a never-ending,
bewildering series of Leviathans rather than a comprehensible single state.
Under a strong conception of transparency that would require a continually
68. See SHELDON S. WOLIN, PoLITICS AND VISION 348-52 (expanded ed., 2004). On
the significance of roles for modern bureaucracies, see 3 WEBER, supra note 62, at 956.
69. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional
Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551 (2001).
70. See, e.g., FCC Organizational Chart, http://www.fcc.gov/fccorgchart.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2010); Texas Department of State Health Services Organizational Chart,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/orgchart/default.shtm (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); City of
Houston, 2010 Organization Chart, http://www.houstontx.gov/budget/lObudadopt/
orgchrt.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
71. See WOLIN, supra note 68, at 351-52.
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visible state, such complexity constitutes a significant problem. If the state
is to be visible and perceptible, it ought to be visible in its entirety as a
whole and as constituent parts-from the federal top of the President, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court, down to the lowest-level service
provider of the local government. To implement transparency's inherent
promise, public access laws must thus attempt to bridge or collapse the vast
organizational distance the state creates so that the public, as citizens,
subjects, and clients, can know the government that ultimately, and at least
theoretically, serves it. Perhaps a Nozickian "night-watchman state" could
be so flat and simple that it proves thoroughly and perfectly visible.72 But
even the relatively simple modem government envisioned by the United
States Constitution allocates tasks and authorities in a complex system that
strains the public's capability to view and comprehend the state73-
especially once the regulatory state, nascent from the colonial period
through the early twentieth century, began to grow.
Below I consider three distinct legal authorities that either create or
reflect this complexity: a constitutional order that imposes only minimal
and quite variable openness requirements on the various branches and
levels of government; an executive branch whose evolving size and
complexity limit Congress's efforts to impose statutory openness obligations
on it; and the blurred lines between the government and the private entities
with whom it collaborates and to whom it outsources operations that
challenge the reach of open government laws.
A. Constitutional Transparencies
The Constitution's initial distribution of authority between the federal
and state governments and among the federal government's branches
blocks the creation of a uniform, comprehensive approach to public access.
Consider the first four Articles in turn. Although the framers engaged in
spirited debates about the need for the proposed legislative branch to be
open to the public, 74 the Constitution imposes no structural, uniform
openness requirement upon Congress. Instead, it requires certain and
72. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-27 (1974). A proponent
of a minimal state would view transparency as merely a practical problem of institutional
design and would rely more heavily on markets than on the regulation of governmental
behavior. See Malcolm Thorburn, Rethinking the Vight- Watchman State?, 60 U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcomingJune 2010).
73. See infra Part II.A.
74. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 361, 410-22 (2004).
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limited disclosure practices,75 and allows only Congress to impose
procedural rules upon itself.76 Notably, when Congress saw fit to place
disclosure and other procedural requirements on executive branch agencies
through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it imposed no such
requirements on itself.77
The Constitution makes even fewer openness demands of the executive,
requiring only that the President "from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union,"78 a minimal command that has
resulted in an annual speech that ritualistically offers self-selected
information deemed politically important to the President's agenda and
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (requiring Congress to keep and publish "from time to
time" a journal of its proceedings and its members' votes, while also allowing Congress to
except "such Parts as may in [its members'] Judgment require Secrecy"); id. § 9, cl. 7
(requiring Congress to publish "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money"); id. § 7, ci. 2 ("[Mhe Names of the Persons voting for
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.").
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . ."). Congress does so through rules established either by each house or by
statute. See Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294 (Richard W.
Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative
Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of the Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345,
346 (2003). Each house of Congress enjoys the exclusive authority to establish its own
procedural and administrative rules, while courts may review challenges only to a rule's
construction or application, not to its rationality, and even then only very deferentially.
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1963) (White, J., dissenting) (applying and
quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)). See generally John C. Roberts, Are
Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment
Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 489, 530-33 (2001) (summarizing Rulemaking Clause
decisions in the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit). A recent example of a congressional self-
disclosure rule came about as part of Congress's response to scandals in which lobbyists
seemed to wield undue influence on the legislative process. See Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Towards a Madisonian, Interest- Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513,
515-17 (2007); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutoy Interpretation,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 519, 529-33 (2009).
77. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) definition of "agency" explicitly
excludes Congress. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(A) (2006). The APA's definition is in turn
incorporated in many open government statutes, such as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(1) (2006), the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2006), the Government in the Sunshine Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (2006), and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C.
app. § 3(3) (2006). See generally James T. O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to
Congress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 415 (1994) (explaining
Congress's limited self-imposed disclosure requirements and proposing means to impose
more).
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
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popularity.7 9 The only additional transparency requirements made of the
presidency and executive branch are those that Congress mandates or that
are self-imposed. The most prominent general statutory mandates placed
upon executive branch agencies are largely uncontroversial in the
abstract.80 The Freedom of Information Act requires the disclosure by
executive branch agencies of certain documents,8 ' the Government in the
Sunshine Act requires executive branch agencies to hold open meetings,82
the Federal Advisory Committee Act places open government requirements
on certain types of committees created by the executive branch,83 and the
Presidential Records Act requires the President to retain records and make
them available to the public after he or she leaves office. 84 Each statute
imposes a particular openness requirement on a limited universe of entities,
most typically those defined by the respective statutes as agencies and
advisory committees.
But as the history of these statutes demonstrates-especially the history
of the FOIA-both the extent of their applicability and the specific
79. For opposing accounts of the what the State of the Union Clause requires of the
President, compare Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief 44 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 7-34 (2002) (arguing that the clause places a duty on the President to
provide extensive information to Congress and assist in deliberative efforts to formulate
legislation and coordinate enforcement), with Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitay Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1207 n.262
(1992) (stating that the clause requires no more than occasional presidential reports to
Congress on general matters). Current expectations of the State of the Union speech and
presidential behavior demonstrate that the latter argument has clearly won out. See Richard
Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 159, 173-74 (2009) (describing
current understanding and interpretive tradition of the State of the Union Clause).
80. This was not always the case. President Johnson did not support the original
statute, and President Ford vetoed the 1974 amendments to the FOIA that strengthened its
disclosure obligations. See FOERSTEL, supra note 34, at 39-48. Prior to his confirmation as a
judge on the D.C. Circuit, Antonin Scalia wrote a blistering critique of the statute in the
American Enterprise Institute's journal in 1982. See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom ofInformation
Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14. Today, however, no elected
official would propose repealing any of the existing open government laws, and efforts to
strengthen them frequently have bipartisan support. See, e.g., Daniel J. Metcalfe, The Cycle
Continues: Congress Amends the FOIA in 2007, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Spring 2008, at 11
(noting the bipartisan effort to enact amendments to the FOIA in 2007). In addition,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supporting the FOIA are either nonpartisan or
range across the political system. Of the NGOs cited supra note 26, Judicial Watch is
avowedly conservative, while others are nonpartisan. See Judicial Watch, About Us,
http://www.judicialwatch.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
82. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
83. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006).
84. Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2006).
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requirements they impose have proven hotly contested.85 As they have
grown more vigorous and coercive, congressional mandates on the
executive branch's openness have approached constitutional common law
limits on inter-branch interference, most notably through the tangled
doctrine of executive privilege and the more generalized concept that the
President should be free from constraint in seeking advice and counsel from
close advisors.86 At the same time, presidential administrations have varied
in their commitment to transparency in general and in their willingness to
interpret these statutes broadly or narrowly,87 while agency compliance
85. See FOERSTEL, supra note 34 (history of the FOIA); SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI,
GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 21-24 (2007)
(history of the FOIA, focusing on discontent with its shortcomings); PETER L. STRAUSS,
TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 762-
66 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (history of the Government in the Sunshine Act and discussion of
criticisms of its effects on agency deliberations); Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The
9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1253-58 (2008) (history
of the FACA, focusing on discontent with its shortcomings and controversies over its
constitutionality); Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of
Constitutional and Property Theoy in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 651, 666-77 (2003) (history and controversies surrounding the
Presidential Records Act of 1978).
86. On the current general state of the doctrines of executive privilege, state secrets,
and presidential prerogatives over information bearing on national security and foreign
affairs, see Pozen, supra note 9, at 321-22. On the constitutional issues surrounding FACA's
limitations on the President's ability to seek advice, see Fenster, supra note 85, at 1254-56.
87. The Attorney General typically issues a memorandum to the federal branch
agencies declaring its interpretation of the FOIA and how the Department ofJustice plans to
litigate contested cases. They tend to vary with each change of party control of the White
House-with a Democratic president, the memo tends to favor disclosure, and with a
Republican president, it tends to favor nondisclosure. Compare Memorandum from Eric
Holder, Attorney General, on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-
march2009.pdf (withdrawing memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft and
announcing "'a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails."' (quoting
Memorandum from President Barack Obama on the Freedom of Information Act to the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/freedom-information-act)), and Memorandum
from Janet Reno, Attorney General, on the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia updates/
VolXIV-3/page3.htm ("The Department [ofJustice] will no longer defend an agency's
withholding of information merely because there is a 'substantial legal basis' for doing so.
Rather, in determining whether or not to defend a nondisclosure decision, we will apply a
presumption of disclosure."), with Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, on
the Freedom of Information Act to the Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies
(Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf ("When you carefully consider FOIA
requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the
Department ofJustice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis .... ).
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with the FOIA mandates varies considerably.8 8  Significantly, the
Constitution's lack of any general openness requirement permits such
variance among administrations.
Some constitutional doctrines force a degree of openness on the federal
and state judiciary. The Sixth Amendment rights to "a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed" require that at least a proportion of the work
performed by courts must be public and include a degree of public
participation,89 while the First Amendment also requires public access to
criminal trials. 90 But there is no constitutional requirement for open
judicial deliberation and conferences, and the tradition of published judicial
opinions is just that-a tradition, rather than a constitutional
requirement.91 Some federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal
allow cameras in the courtroom, as do some state courts, but no federal
constitutional requirement or right binds courts, and no systematic
approach prevails. 92  At the same time, modem criminal and civil
procedural rules place significant emphases on pretrial procedures and
alternative dispute resolutions that undercut the relatively simple and
abstract constitutional provisions regarding an open judicial process.93 The
88. See COALITION OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN Gov'T, THE WAITING GAME: FOIA
PERFORMANCE HITS NEw Lows (2007), http://www.cjog.net/documents/
CXFOIA reportPart_1.pdf (comparing agency request backlog across 1998, 2002,
2005, and 2006 and finding variability over time and among agencies).
89. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
90. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76, 581 (1980)
(plurality opinion); see also Kitrosser, supra note 29, at 106-11 (summarizing Richmond
Newspapers and discussing its progeny).
91. Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurispmudence ofInformation Flow: How
the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 267, 289-93 (2003).
Moreover, despite their status as government documents free from the restraints of copyright
protection, many judicial documents in the federal system are difficult for the public to view
without paying expensive electronic access fees. See Stephen Schultze, Electronic Public Access
Fees and the United States Federal Courts' Budget: An Ovewiew (Harvard Univ. Berkman Ctr. for
Internet & Soc'y, Working Paper) http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/-sjschultze/Schultze
PACERBudgetNorking-Paper.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
92. See Courtroom Television Network, LLC v. State, 769 N.Y.S.2d 70, 96-97 (Sup.
Ct. 2003) (giving an overview of federal and state approaches to cameras in the courtroom).
93. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Particzation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911 (2006) (decrying lack of public access to discretionary governmental decisions in
the criminal process, especially in the plea bargain process); Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency
and Civil Justice: The Internal and External Value of Sunlight, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2009)
(former Special Master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001
discussing the incomplete progress of and prospects for greater transparency in civil
litigation); Hamilton & Kohnen, supra note 91, at 293-97 (noting the existence of general
rules ofjudicial and court access, as well as the various exceptions and limiting principles to
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Constitution's lack of a general, expansive right or requirement for judicial
transparency allows federal and state courts significant leeway in opening or
closing their operations to public view.
Because the United States Constitution fails both to command states to
be transparent and to provide individual rights that would allow individuals
to impose administrative openness, individual state constitutions and
governments have been free to devise their own open government
mandates. Shaped by idiosyncratic institutional designs, states take
relatively diverse approaches that mix statutory and constitutional
requirements and impose different degrees of openness. 94 Transparency
advocates frequently express frustration at the variability and relative rigor
of state laws. A 1993 survey, for example, found wide variation in the form
and substance of state open meeting laws. 95 A 2007 report issued by two
nongovernmental organizations used a variety of criteria to evaluate state
constitutional and statutory provisions and declared that thirty-eight states
had failing laws.96 Compounding the problem, state officials and judges
exhibit varying degrees of commitment to and compliance with their
respective open government laws; nongovernmental organizations and
media groups in many states that have performed audits of state and
municipal government agencies' response to open record requests variably
decry and hesitantly applaud agencies' performances. 97 A decentralized
those rules); Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture ofthe Criminal System,
30 CARDozo L. REV. 965, 982-85 (2008) (discussing public access to the criminal justice
system in general); Judith Resnik, Uncovering Disclosing and Discovering How the Public Dimensions
of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 542-60 (2006) (describing the
delegation of formal civil adjudication to relatively inaccessible administrative courts,
arbitrators, and settlement agreements).
94. See Rossi, supra note 69, at 554-55. Numerous websites offer links to or texts of the
fifty states' laws. See, e.g, Nat'l Freedom of Information Coal., State FOI Laws,
http://www.nfoic.org/state-foi-laws (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); Reporters Comm. For
Freedom of the Press, Open Government Guide, http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php (last
visited Aug. 5, 2010).
95. Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in
the 1990s-An Analysis ofState Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q 1165 (1993).
96. Nat'l Freedom of Information Coal. & Better Gov't Ass'n, States Failing FOI
Responsiveness, http://www.nfoic.org/bga (last visited Aug. 5, 2010). A 2002 version of the
study gave failing grades to eight states, but a D+ or lower to twenty-four states, and the
remaining states received no higher than a B. Better Gov't Ass'n & Investigative Reporters
and Editors, Freedom of Information in the USA: Part 1 (2002),
http://www.ire.org/foi/bga/; see also BETTER GOv'T Ass'N & INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS
AND EDITORS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE USA SURVEY RESULTS (2002),
http://www.ire.org/foi/bga/ranking.pdf (grading and ranking states in 2002 study).
97. See Nat'l Freedom of Information Coal., Audits and Open Records Surveys,
http://www.nfoic.org/audits-and-open-records-surveys (last visited Aug. 5, 2010) (collecting
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federalist system in an area unregulated by federal constitutional rights and
commands thus results in a wide-ranging degree of transparency across
states and municipalities.
Rather than imposing transparency's ideal of a constantly and
thoroughly visible state, the constitutional scheme sets forth some limited,
variable transparency requirements to individual federal branches, while it
restrains the ability of any branch to impose further requirements on
another.98  The Constitution created a decentralized complex of
government institutions without a uniform standard or set of commands
that would make the state as a whole and in its parts fully visible to its
public. It also leaves to individual states the authority to establish their own
governmental structure and administrative norms (within constitutional
constraints) and limits the federal government from interfering with state
governance. The idiosyncratic nature of each branch and level-its
different tasks, its distinct history, and the conditions under which each of
its bureaucracies works-renders an organizational map that resists
transparency as an abstract and absolute norm, especially as each branch
and level expands to engage more complex and demanding tasks. The
Constitution's organizational plan, then, not only fails to create a
transparent state-it affirmatively stands in the way of creating one.
B. Statutory Transparencies
Like the Constitution, congressional efforts to impose openness
obligations on the executive branch have also failed to establish a general,
uniform legal norm, again in part because of the complex organization of
government institutions. Congress's intent in enacting the FOIA, the most
prominent of Congress's open government enactments, as well as language
within the statute itself suggested that it would sweep broadly across the
federal government. 99 Those entities subject to its mandates are required to
make certain information available as a matter of course, 00 and must also
and linking to audits performed in different states).
98. Cf Samaha, supra note 5, at 948-49 (describing the constitutional regime for public
access to information as "Unsatisfying").
99. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006) ("Each agency shall make available to the public
information as follows. . . ."); 112 CONG. REc. 13641 (1966) (statement of Rep. Moss in
floor debate prior to the House of Representatives' vote to pass S. 1160, which would
become the Freedom of Information Act) (The FOIA will "remove every barrier to
information about-and understanding of-Government activities .... ); EDWARD
KENNEDY, AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, S. REP. No. 93-854, at 3
(1974) (declaring that the FOIA amendments would draw back the "curtains of
secrecy . .. around the business of government").
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1-2) (2006).
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respond to public requests for documents not subject to those
requirements. 101
The FOIA does not, however, apply uniformly across the federal
government, as it explicitly does not apply to the judiciary or to Congress
itself. 0 2 Indeed, it does not even apply to all entities within the executive
branch. It only affirmatively applies to "[e]ach agency," 0 3 a term that the
FOIA defines in an enumerated list.104 Congress has granted certain
agencies, most notably the CIA, broad exemptions from disclosure. 05 The
Supreme Court has held that the FOIA's legislative history makes clear that
Congress intended to exclude the Office of the President, the President's
immediate personal staff, and units in the Executive Office of the President
whose sole function is to advise and assist the President. 06 It remains
unclear how broadly that exception sweeps. The Court has yet to provide
an authoritative interpretation of it,107 while lower federal courts have
developed an indeterminate multifactor test to ascertain whether the FOIA
101. Id. § 552(a)(3). Some documents are exempted based either on their content, their
status as inter- or intra-office memoranda, or specific exemptions created by other statutes.
Id. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
102. Id. § 551(1)(A), (B) (exempting the Congress and federal courts from the definition of
"agency").
103. Id. § 552(a).
104. Id. § 552(f)(1) (defining "agency" as "any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of
the President), or any independent regulatory agency").
105. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(1) (2006) (directing the CIA to "protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure"); id. § 403g (exempting the CIA from
any law requiring "disclosure of the organization, functions, names official titles, salaries, or
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency"). See generally CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,
167-68 (1985) (applying statutory exemption to CIA). The third exemption of the FOIA, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2006), provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," so long as the statute meets certain
requirements.
106. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 15 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)). More recent congressional
enactments that incorporate the FOIA's definition of agency similarly make plain the
distinction between "Executive Office" and "Office of the President." See Wilson v. Libby,
535 F.3d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, which
followed and incorporated the FOIA's definition of agency, similarly excludes the President,
Vice President, and their close advisors from liability).
107. The Court considered this issue briefly in Kissinger, but did no more than resolve the
issue that Kissinger was acting in his capacity as National Security Adviser when the
documents in controversy were created, and therefore, the documents were not considered
the records of an agency under the FOIA. See 445 U.S. at 156. The Court made no effort
to develop a test for lower courts to apply in more difficult cases.
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applies to nontraditional and advisory entities that the President or
executive branch agencies created within the Executive Office of the
President.108 The factors include whether the entity exercises "substantial
independent authority" 09 and has been granted sufficiently broad
delegated power such that it has "less continuing interaction with the
President";"10 whether the entity's "sole function [is] to advise and assist the
President,""' and it is "close operationally" to the President;" 2 and
"whether it has a self-contained structure.""13 The more independent the
entity seems, the more likely a court will deem it an agency and subject it to
the FOIA's disclosure regime; while the closer the entity is to the President,
the less likely the FOIA will apply."14
This standard leads to seemingly random results. Among the entities
found to be agencies under the FOIA that were sufficiently removed from
the President and that possessed sufficient independent authority are the
Office of Science and Technology (1971),115 the Office of Management and
Budget (1978),116 and the Council on Environmental Quality (1980)."7
Among those found not to be agencies because they are too close to the
President, have insufficient independent authority, or both, are the Council
of Economic Advisers (1985),118 White House Counsel (1990),ll9 the
108. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Office ofAdmin., 566 F.3d 219,
222-23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reiterating the series of tests). On the complexity of the Executive
Office of the President (EOP) and the fact that presidential decisionmaking exempt from the
FOIA is in fact decisions made by executive branch bureaucrats, not by the President him-
or herself, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 753 (2007).
109. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. If so, then it is an "agency" subject to the FOIA. Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288,
1293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
111. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075.
112. Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293.
113. Id. at 1293.
114. In this way, the FOIA's definition of agency implicitly recognizes constitutional limits
on Congress's authority to regulate the presidential deliberative process, which also turns in
part on the relative position of the advisor. As the D.C. Circuit has held, communications
made between presidential advisers, but not directly to the President, can be protected under
the privilege for presidential communications only if the advisers are not too "remote and
removed from the President," and at minimum must be within the staff of a White House
adviser rather than an executive branch agency. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 751-52
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
115. Soucie,448F.2dat 1078-79.
116. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds,
442 U.S. 347 (1979).
117. Pac. Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1263, 1265-66
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
118. Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief (1993),120 the Executive
Residence of the White House (1995),121 the National Security Council
(1996),122 the Smithsonian Institution (1997),123 and the Office of
Administration within the Executive Office of the President (2009).124
Meyer v. Bush, a 2-1 decision in one of the D.C. Circuit's most influential
efforts to parse the definition of agency, illustrates this confusing
indeterminacy.125 The issue before the court was whether the FOIA
applied to the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, a cabinet-level
entity created by President Ronald Reagan to lead his administration's
efforts to reduce federal regulation. ForJudge Lawrence Silberman, joined
by fellow Reagan appointee Judge David Sentelle in the majority, the Task
Force served as an advisory body that offered nothing more than guidance
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding regulatory rules
and programs. It "was positioned between the OMB" and the President,
and thus "only a hair's breadth from the President," and its members,
many of whom (including the Vice President) were also agency heads or
cabinet members in their own right, were also "the functional equivalents of
assistants to the President."' 2 6 Therefore, it was not an agency under the
FOIA. For Judge Patricia Wald, a Carter appointee writing in dissent, the
Task Force was a "separate functional establishment within the Executive
Office of the President to which the President delegated some of his
executive powers," and therefore a powerful cohesive unit with direct
supervisory control over agencies below it in the hierarchical chain of
executive branch authority. 27
Both arguments seem plausible under the D.C. Circuit's test, and no
essential, consistent logic emerges from the test's application in Meyer v. Bush
or in the related case law. The executive branch has proven too
amorphous and confusing for a thorough and uniform legislative
transparency regime. When the President or Congress creates a new entity
within the executive branch that does not clearly constitute an agency, we
will not know its obligations under the FOIA without an extensive, fact-
specific survey on the messy organizational map of the federal government,
119. Nat'l Sec. Archive v. Archivist of the U.S., 909 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
120. Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
121. Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
122. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
123. Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
124. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Office of Admin., 566 F.3d 219,
224 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
125. Meyer, 981 F.2d 1288.
126. Id at 1294.
127. Id. at 1298, 1307, 1313 (Wald,J., dissenting).
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unless Congress clearly exempts it from or clearly subjects it to the FOIA in
its organic statute.128  Indeed, presidential administrations create such
entities regularly, especially to oversee or advise politically significant and
controversial programs. Examples include the taskforce created to oversee
deregulatory efforts during the Reagan administration, as seen in Meyer v.
Bush;'29 the Task Force on National Health Care Reform on health care
reform during the Clinton administration, headed by first lady Hillary
Clinton, to which the Federal Advisory Committee Act was held not to
apply; 30 and the National Energy Policy Development Group in the
George W. Bush administration, headed by Vice President Cheney, to
which the Federal Advisory Committee Act was also held not to apply.' 3
These entities played key roles in devising and implementing policy for the
presidents who created them, and their creators designed and placed them
within the executive branch in a way that limits public access to their
proceedings and records.
C. Private Transparencies
The American state has long used private entities to perform seemingly
public functions,132 and it has long delegated to or worked closely with
private actors when it has engaged in law- and regulation-making.1'3
Indeed, these relationships are so longstanding and embedded in public
governance that no clear boundary separates the state from the private
entities with which it works to regulate and deliver services.134 Should
seemingly public information produced or possessed by private entities be
made public? Similarly, should information produced by or concerning
128. Congress occasionally exempts new, innovative agency-like entities from FOIA
obligations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006) (exempting the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, created as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, from the FOIA).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
130. See Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 916 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
131. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See alsoJudicial Watch,
Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 131-32 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that employees of
the Department of Energy, whose work for that agency would be subject to the FOIA,
produced work that was not "agency records" subject to the FOIA when they were detailed
to the National Energy Policy Development Group, which was not subject to the FOIA).
132. See DONALD F. KETEL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE
MARKETS 6-8 (1993); Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; irne for
Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. LJ. 321, 322-23 (2004).
133. See Louis L.Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
134. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 5 (1999). The best conceptual
treatment of this issue in the legal academic literature is Chris Sagers, The Myth of
"Privatization,"59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007).
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private entities with which the state collaborates or transacts be made
public? Under the populist understanding of transparency, the private
information that the government possesses or could or should possess, or
that private actors produce or disclose while participating in or negotiating
with government, becomes public information and therefore should be
made available to the public. If the state is to be visible, then all of its parts,
including private individuals and entities that actively interact with or serve
as adjuncts to the state, should be visible.
This proposition has not, however, prevailed. Consider first the
dynamics at play over the disclosure of information the government gathers
about private individuals and entities through its lawmaking, rulemaking,
and law enforcement activities. Federal law requires the federal
government to protect the privacy of private individuals from and about
whom it collects information in some contexts,'3 5 while the FOIA excepts
from disclosure the privileged or confidential commercial data the
government collects in order to encourage those it regulates to continue to
share information.136 Federal law also protects some information submitted
by owners and operators of "critical infrastructure" from disclosure on the
grounds that the release of such information might threaten national
security.137 The state's intimate and ongoing relationship with individuals
and those it regulates limits the extent to which current law allows it to
135. The Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of routine personal information except to the
person to whom the record pertains, or with that person's permission. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b),
(d) (2006). In addition, the FOIA's exemptions include privacy protection. See id. § 552(b)(6)
(exempting files on individuals for which disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy"); id. § 552(b)(7)(C) (exempting records or information compiled
for law enforcement only to the extent that their disclosure "could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
136. Id. § 552(b)(4). Indeed, corporations engage in extensive "reverse-FOIA" litigation
in order to preempt efforts by their competitors to use FOIA requests to obtain their trade
secrets and other valuable information. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
293-94, 317-18 (1979) (approving of reverse-FOIA litigation by finding a private right of
action under the APA to seek injunctive relief prohibiting the disclosure of information
submitted to the government that plaintiffs claim to be commercially sensitive). For
agencies, the reverse-FOIA process has proven costly, as regulated corporate entities use
litigation to secure their information from competitors. See David C. Vladeck, Information
Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape ofFederal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1787,
1817 n.197 (2008). Nevertheless, for industry representatives, the reverse-FOIA process
proves relatively indeterminate and not a guarantee to protect against disclosure. SeeJames
W. Conrad, Protecting Pnivate Securiy-Related Information from Disclosure by Government Agencies, 57
ADMIN. L. REv. 715, 729-32 (2005).
137. See Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 211-




disclose private information that it controls. Whether as a matter of
personal privacy, corporate function and commercial property, or national
security, private entities are not treated simply as part of the state, even if
the state collects information about them or uses them to perform
important state or state-like functions.
At times the government does more than merely collect information
about private entities and individuals; it also collaborates or negotiates with
them in regulatory programs sometimes referred to as "new" or "new
public" governance. 138 Departing from a traditional top-down command-
and-control approach, in which an identifiable state agency requires an
identifiable private entity to comply with mandatory practices or regulatory
targets or face punishment, a state entity adopting a new governance
approach to achieve a particular outcome works closely with private actors
to develop and implement a program or programs that can best achieve its
goal. The federal Negotiated Rulemaking Actl 39 has created the most
formalized and congressionally authorized model for new governance
processes, allowing an administrative agency to negotiate openly with
regulated entities and interested parties through a chartered committee that
observes the openness requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.140 Additional "tools" developed by new governance advocates offer a
much wider spectrum of public-private coordination than the formal
negotiation process, including some that are significantly less formalized.141
The blurring of government authority in new governance efforts raises
significant concerns about a resulting program's accountability and
visibility to the public. 142  Government delegation of some degree of
regulatory authority to private or hybrid public-private entities may
increase the state's organizational complexity and may thereby decrease the
state's visibility to the public. Some degree of privacy may be essential to
138. For a recent summary of the field, see Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the
21st Centuy Regulatoy State, 86 TEx. L. REV. 819, 823-37 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (GrAinne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) and
LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
(2006)).
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2006).
140. See id. § 564(a) (requiring notice of regulatory negotiations in the Federal Register);
id. § 565(a) (requiring formal chartering of committees); id. § 566(d), (g) (requiring that
committees keep meeting minutes and records consistent with the FACA).
141. See Lester M. Salamon, The .New Governance and the Tools ofPublic Action: An Introduction,
in THE TOOLS OF GovERNJMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEw GOVERNANCE 1, 9-22 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT] (defining the new governance
paradigm and listing various tools that fall within it).
142. See Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in TootS OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 141, at 523, 524-28.
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the process, however. If private entities that collaborate with the
government would thereby become subject to open government laws, they
may be less willing to engage directly with the government. Their
reluctance would in turn undermine the collaborative approach that new
governance seeks to promote. At the same time, to the extent that current
law limits the FOIA's applicability to new governance efforts, then the new
governance approach appears significantly less than perfectly transparent.
Proponents argue, however, that collaborative governance offers a more
"dynamic accountability" than conventional top-down regulatory
programs; new governance, they argue, imposes measures like peer review
and reporting requirements that provide as much if not more government
oversight than traditional public governance.143 In addition, some new
governance programs themselves enhance information disclosure, targeting
particular kinds of data whose release to the public can inform individuals
and positively shape their behavior.144 Thus, proponents argue, new
governance results in better, more effective regulation, although perhaps it
allows less openness according to traditional conceptions of public
disclosure and transparency.145 Again, a vigorous populist approach to
transparency would protest against those aspects of new governance
programs that offer less than full disclosure-protests that, if made into law,
might conflict with and undermine whatever gains this less traditional form
143. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in
LAw AND NEw GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 395, 400-01 (Grdinne de Burca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Finns,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE LJ. 377, 438-39 (2006)
(arguing that proper design of new governance programs can provide sufficient public
accountability).
144. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 1-7 (2007); Janet A. Weiss, Public Information, in
TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 141, at 227-33.
145. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 455-57 (2004) (arguing that transparency
and increased access to information do not themselves improve regulation, and that the state
may need to be less than perfectly transparent in order to develop more effective regulatory
programs). In a volume of essays intended to serve as a guide to new governance, the only
essay that mentions and seems to embrace open-ended public transparency appears as the
twentieth of twenty-three chapters and includes the topic as one among many "policy tools"
that further democratic ends. Steven Rathgeb Smith & Helen Ingram, Policy Tools and
Democracy, in TooLs oF GOVERNMENT, supra note 141, at 565, 579. Furthermore, the same
volume's introduction concedes that for new governance to succeed in producing a more
effective regulatory state, "classical notions of democratic accountability may need to be
loosened and more pluralistic conceptions developed," while the introduction fails to include
transparency as one of its criteria for evaluating particular new governance tools. Salamon,




The state frequently does more than collaborate with private entities-it
often and explicitly contracts out or privatizes government services.146 This
longstanding tradition of American governance offers, so its proponents
say, a more efficient and effective means to deliver services that the
government has performed in the past or can perform.147 In an especially
poignant example, the federal government has begun outsourcing to
private firms not only the digital storage of its information,148 but also its
handling of FOIA requests, for the stated reason that private information
management companies can provide better, more reliable, and less
expensive service in these activities than the federal civil service.149
Proponents argue that outsourcing not only improves government services,
but it makes the resulting smaller government leaner, more efficient and
flexible, and more responsive-a type of reform that enjoys bipartisan
support.o50 For transparency proponents and critics of privatization alike,
the public's need to view the state's operations does not disappear merely
by virtue of a contractual agreement with a private entity.' 5' When the law
extends open government obligations to private entities, however, it
threatens to undercut the instrumental and political advantages of
privatization and new forms of governance.152 Unsurprisingly, given this
146. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369-
71 (2003). The academic literature on the privatization of public services is vast; a useful
citation to it is in Sagers, supra note 134, at 43-48 & nn.14-38.
147. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 651-
57 (1986).
148. See Office of Information & Privacy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Treatment ofAgency Records
Maintained for an Agency by a Government Contractor for Purposes of Records Management, FOIA POST,
July 2008, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/agencyrecords.htm (stating that the FOIA,
as amended by § 9 of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 9, 121
Stat. 2524, 2528-29 (to be codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)), applies to agency
records maintained by private contractors).
149. Christopher Lee, On FOIA Front, More Agencies Contract Out, WASH. POST, June 8,
2004, at A21; J. Nicholas Hoover, Microsofi Taps into Open Government Market,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.informationweek.com/news/
government/info-management/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=222002 100.
150. See DAVID G. FREDERICKSON & H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, MEASURING THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE HoLLow STATE 21 (2006); LIGHT, supra note 134, at 6. This claim
is widely contested, particularly in terms of the actual size of government and the limits
placed on government control and management of contractors' work. See FREDERICKSON &
FREDERICKSON, supra, at 20-21; LIGHT, supra note 134, at 176-79.
151. PAUL VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 90, 105-06 (2007). But see Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003)
(arguing that privatization can extend public norms into the private sector by encouraging
and sometimes forcing private entities to incorporate public goals in their activities).
152. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 586-87
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conflict, federal and state laws have taken halting, uncertain steps to impose
transparency norms on private entities with whom the state is contracting
or governing.153 The issue pervades all national governments with freedom
of information laws, and as Alasdair Roberts has explained, it has caused a
"conceptual muddle" regarding how "to determine where the boundaries
of government lie" and how best to draft rules that can force disclosure
upon private entities that "appear governmental."154
These conflicts between the gains of public-private collaboration, and
the limits such collaboration place on the state's visibility, illustrate the
inevitable and pervasive barriers to making the government thoroughly
transparent. In order to meet the public's expectations for the range and
quality of services it must perform, the state must work with private entities;
but that work may as a result either make the state less transparent, or may
provoke an effort to treat private entities as state actors that will in turn
undercut the range and quality of services the state can offer. If the state
must be visible, its efforts to provide effective regulation and services are
likely to suffer, at least to some extent.
D. The Impossibility of Organizational Exposure
In all of its various complexities, the contemporary state organization of
the United States poses great challenges to any effort to impose visibility.
The complexities are both endogenous-reflecting historical, path-
dependent decisions about institutional design made at the nation's
founding and throughout its history-and exogenous-the result of
governmental adaptations to social and economic development in civil
(2000).
153. See Matthew D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, When Government "Contracts Out":
Privatization, Accountability and Constitutional Doctrine, in ACCEss DENIED: FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 85, 90-93 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L.
Splichal eds., 2000); Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis
of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999). In one
illustrative case, the Supreme Court held that private organizations receiving financial grant
money from the federal government do not fall within the FOIA definition of agency unless a
federal agency provides extensive and detailed supervision of their work. Forsham v. Harris,
445 U.S. 169, 186 (1980). Nearly two decades later, Congress overturned that decision by
narrowly extending the FOIA's application to information produced by federal grantees
relied upon by an agency in promulgating regulations. See Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681
(1998). On the history and aftermath of the so-called "Shelby Amendment," see Donald T.
Hornstein, Accounting for Science The Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean
Administrative Law, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 230-33 (2003).
154. AIASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 160-61 (2006).
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society. Transparency cannot simply be imposed on such a massive
network of institutions and individuals; legal, regulatory, and normative
projects to make the state more visible must grapple with design,
implementation, and enforcement issues across a broad, diverse range of
levels, branches, and webs.
III. EXPOSING THE PHYSICAL STATE
Two of the state's most basic physical characteristics impede its visibility
to the public. The first is the state's territorial size and political-geographic
complexity. For the state to be thoroughly transparent and reduce or
collapse its distance from the public, its operations and personnel must be
identifiable and made available for public inspection, no matter their
location. The immense size and intricate overlap of government entities in
the United States frustrate any effort to achieve such perfect or even near-
perfect visibility. The second impediment is architectural. The thoroughly
transparent state must be capable of allowing the public to view where and
how government employees work: the physical spaces of the built
bureaucratic environment. Government buildings have standard
architectural elements-walls, ceilings, doors, and windows-that serve
naturally to exclude the public and obscure the state. Even if it were
physically possible either to enable the public to see through the structures
that house the state or to invite the public into these structures at all times,
the effort can prove so intrusive and costly as to make the work of public
officials difficult if not impossible. The first two sections of this Part offer a
more detailed account of these geographic and architectural issues, while
the third section describes two instances in which access to information laws
confront, and ultimately fail to respond coherently to, the state's spatial and
physical complexity.
A. Distance
The federal government is sovereign over a significant amount of well-
populated territory. Its three branches may all have their headquarters in
Washington, but their decisions and administration also occur in agency
and congressional offices and federal courthouses scattered throughout
Washington as well as the fifty states. The federal government shares
sovereignty over the same territory with state governments, and both the
federal and state governments overlap municipal governments. Many state
and local governments preside over extraordinary amounts of territory
from their capitols and city halls-heavily populated Los Angeles County,
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for example, occupies more than 4,000 square miles of land, while sparsely
populated Alaska sits on over 570,000 square miles.' 55 Enabling the public
to view such diffuse Leviathans proves a difficult challenge, as does
enforcing any general edict for openness upon officials in geographically
scattered organizations.
Both the Hamiltonian faith in administrative and structural means to
manage government and enable democracy across vast distances,156 and
the Weberian warning that such solutions would lead to an imperfect
modem state ruled by an information-hoarding bureaucracy,'57
foreshadowed ongoing arguments and anxieties about the state's operations
in an expansive American territory. Weber correctly predicted the
expansion of the American administrative state, while Hamilton anticipated
systematic efforts to control it, efforts that began almost immediately in the
federalist period of the early Republic.' 58 A larger and more diverse nation
than even Hamilton's Anti-Federalist opponents feared, coupled with an
administrative apparatus that Weber foresaw but that Hamilton could not
have anticipated, has made Hamilton's confident forecast of private
collective actions to control the administrative state appear naive at best.' 59
His general prescription for public and private institutional checks and
balances, however, survives in the federal and state laws that attempt to
provide uniform controls over vast and far-flung bureaucracies. In the
present day, federal and state administrative laws impose standard
procedural rules, including requirements for public access to information,
equally on the operations of agencies' headquarters and its offices. At the
same time, federal courthouses, enforcing federal law and using uniform
federal rules of civil and criminal procedure and providing equal levels of
openness, were dispersed across the nation in the twentieth century in an
155. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); U.S.
Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Alaska, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
158. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY, 199-209 (1948); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1305-07 (2006).
159. Nevertheless, the role of the press in checking government misdeeds-one of the
roles that Hamilton hoped it would play-has remained the strongest justification for First
Amendment protections against prior restraint. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931) (asserting that press liberties are necessary as a means to protect




effort to extend both federal authority and federal rights.16 0 At least as a
formal matter, then, the American state appears to have proven Hamilton
correct by successfully addressing the territorial concerns of the Anti-
Federalists.
As a matter of practice, however, these formal commands are not self-
enforcing. Central authorities have limited control over their dispersed
organizations, and not all branches and agencies of the individual units are
equally visible to their citizens. Even assuming that those at the center of
authority want their inferior officers to be visible to the public-a desire
that appears to vary among agencies and executive administrations, given
the variability of their levels of compliancel 6'-the periphery can resist
central commands, as Michael Lipsky observed in his study of "street-level
bureaucrats" and the "relative autonomy from organizational authority"
enjoyed by front-line government officials. 162 Police officers on the street
and teachers in the classroom, as well as public information officials and
FOIA officers removed from an agency's central command, inevitably have
significant discretion to make substantive and administrative decisions both
as a means of responding to the particular context in which they find
themselves and because they cannot in fact be controlled.163 Physical
distance, whether counted in miles, in feet, or by the floors of an office
building, limits the extent to which superiors can monitor and exercise
authority. If administrative discretion increases across space, and Weber's
assertion that bureaucracies prefer to hoard information is correct, then
efforts to impose transparency on large, far-flung agencies will be doomed
to failure-or at least to incomplete success. The geographical dispersal of
authority thus limits both the state's ability to supply bureaucracies that the
public can see and the law's ability to command them to be seen.
The government's size and dispersal across the territory it governs is one
obstacle to achieving a populist ideal of transparency; the state's
jurisdictional complexity is an additional one that can hinder the public's
view of the state. "By its very nature," the political geographer John Short
has written, "the nation-state is a spatial phenomenon," one that manifests
160. SeeJudith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1106-08
(2006).
161. See supra text accompanying note 97.
162. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIc SERVICEs 16-18 (1980).
163. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 327-29 (1989). For a recent reconsideration of
Lipsky's concept of the street-level bureaucrat, see Simon Halliday, Nicola Bums, Neil
Hutton, Fergus McNeill & Cyrus Tata, Street-Level Bureaucracy, Interprofessional Relations, and
Coping Mechanisms: A Study of Criminal Justice Social Workers in the Sentencing Process, 3 1 LAW &
POL'y 405 (2009).
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itself most clearly in the frontiers and borders between nations and in a
nation's internal division into such administrative subdivisions as regional,
state, and local governments and their sub-agencies.164 This might suggest
that a geographical map, which visualizes a series of logical-if somewhat
haphazardly arranged-nested centers and peripheries, would provide a
blueprint for political order and behavior.' 65 Like an organizational chart
that claims to offer a hierarchical rendering of coordinated government
entities, a map of the United States implies that political power is dispersed
across a territory: the nation, with its federal capitol; the states, with their
state capitols; and metropolitan regions, with their city halls, urban cores,
and suburban and exurban peripheries.166 Where authority is dispersed
logically, the public can view, comprehend, and hold accountable those
officials it can find in the cores of the respective (federal, state, and local)
jurisdictional bodies.
As Richard Thompson Ford has noted regarding local governments,
however, we cannot assume that territory and the maps that record it
accurately reflect an essential, authoritative sovereign power, nor can we
assume that a hierarchical relationship among political divisions
subordinates the smallest and lowest subunit.167 A governmental unit's
authority, jurisdictional reach, and public accessibility are never as fixed or
stable as a map suggests. 68 Federal, state, and local authorities whose
territorial jurisdictions overlap any particular location frequently confuse
the public.169 How can the public see a state when they cannot discern
164. JOHN R. SHORT, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 123 (1982).
165. On maps' representational ideal, see Michael R. Curry, Shelf Length Zero: The
Disappearance of the Geographical Text, in SPACE AND SOCIAL THEORY 88, 90 (Georges Benko &
Ulf Strohmayer eds., 1997). As representations, maps are not natural but are instead the
result of efforts to produce a visual representation of the social world. See HENRI LEFEBVRE,
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 84-85 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991).
166. John Agnew, Maps and Models in Political Studies: A Reply to Comments, 15 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 165 (1996).
167. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1860-61 (1994); cf NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAw, SPACE, AND
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 90-91 (1994) (critiquing the abstract conception of space that
maps induce); W. Wesley Pue, Wrestling with Law: (Geographical) Specificity vs. (Legal) Abstraction,
11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 566, 567-68 (1990) (critiquing law's blindness to spatial complexity).
168. I am relying here on Henri Lefebvre's conception of the state's abstract political
space and of the state's complex and unfolding relationship with its territory. See HENRI
LEFEBVRE, STATE, SPACE, VORLD 224-25 (Neil Brenner & Stuart Elden eds., Gerald
Moore et al. trans., 2009); LEFEBVRE, supra note 165, at 278-85. See generally Neil Brenner &
Stuart Elden, Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory, 3 INT'L POL. Soc. 353, 358-61 (2009).
169. Cf Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1935-36 (2008)
(describing the difficulty of dividing regulatory authority among different levels of
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which government entities are sovereign over a particular piece of land?
Two examples: At the local level, especially in major metropolitan service
areas, city and county governments frequently overlap or have shifting
boundaries, requiring regional or crossjurisdictional coordination and
governance and making regulatory responsibility difficult to pinpoint.o70
Secondly, lakes and rivers often traverse state boundaries and are overseen
(or, sometimes, are not overseen and are therefore the site of significant
conflict) by complex regional agreements or government authorities.'71
These liminal spaces-parts not of one but of numerous jurisdictions, with
no clear or obvious boundaries-render efforts both to govern and to view
governance difficult if not impossible. Moreover, the modern state's
sovereignty has long extended beyond its mere territory and been shaped
and challenged internally not only by its citizens but by other states,
nongovernmental organizations, transnational corporations, supranational
institutions, and the global flows of economic trade and capital. 72 To the
extent that different levels of government might cooperate with, ignore, or
contest each other's jurisdiction and policies, the public will struggle to
identify the particular government entity or entities from which they need
to seek information. 73
government).
170. JON C. TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION 5 (2006) (describing growth
of major metropolitan service areas); cf PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE
REGIONAL CITY 61-63 (2001) (describing the patchwork of local governments in an
increasingly "Regional City").
171. See, e.g., Mark T. Imperial & Derek Kauneckis, Moving from Conflict to Collaboration:
Watershed Governance in Lake Tahoe, 43 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 1009, 1018-32 (2003) (discussing
the history of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, formed by an interstate compact
between California and Nevada, to oversee the planning of Lake Tahoe and its environs);
Steven T. Miano & Michael E. Crane, Eastern Water Law: Historical Perspectives and Emerging
Trends, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Fall 2003, at 14, 17-18 (discussing the complexity and
varied success of interstate water compacts in the eastern United States).
172. See JOHN A. AGNEW, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 6-7 (2009); Saskia
Sassen, Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications for National Borders, 30 MICH.J. INT'L L.
567 (2009). See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? 5-
9 (2009) (discussing the long history of, and controversy over, the relationship between
American territory and the reach of American law). The notion of a state's absolute
sovereignty within its borders is untenable in an international legal environment. See, e.g.,
Stephen D. Krasner, Problenatic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED
RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (identifying
competing conceptions of less-than-absolute sovereignty); Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty,
Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. OF INT'L AFF. 11, 14-18 (2006)
(describing emergence of "contingent sovereignty" in international law).
173. This issue concerns the overlapping itself, not whether multiagency and
multigovernment cooperation, their opposites, or some point along a continuum of




Government buildings and offices enable public employees to perform
their tasks by housing the spaces where officials, managers, and civil
servants work, converse, officially meet, and store and protect official
records. By containing state activity within built structures, buildings and
offices also enclose that activity within walls and ceilings, and control access
and visibility to it via doors and windows. As a result of making it possible
for officials to work and to sort and protect the records that they collect and
produce, government buildings inevitably separate officials from the public
that they serve. Accordingly, allowing the public to view and enter
government buildings is at once an issue of design and practice: can the
public see and navigate its way into the building, and is the public in fact
invited or allowed to enter?l 74  The competing concerns of design and
public policy help determine the extent of public access to officials and to
government information.
Public architecture aspires to more than the simple, utilitarian goal of
housing offices and allowing or limiting public access, however. It also
attempts to shape the affective relationship between the state and its
public. 75 It works iconically and symbolically to establish an identity for
the national, state, or municipal governmental unit or units that a building
hosts.176  A public building's size, architectural design, and location
"cooperative federalism," see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92
YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663 (2001). For an account that seeks to complicate the
"cooperative" concept, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009). On the role of thoroughgoing conflict between federal
and state governments, see Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover
Federalism in the Wake ofthe War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1277, 1295-1301 (2004).
174. HAROLD D. LASSWELL WITH MERRITT B. Fox, THE SIGNATURE OF POWER:
BUILDINGS, COMMUNICATION, AND POLICY 18 (1979); Mary R. Domahidy & James F.
Gilsinan, The Back Stage Is Not the Back Room: How Spatial Arrangements Affect the Administration of
Public Affairs, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 588 (1992). On the highly structured nature of the
courtroom as a controlled public space, see Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal
Courts in an Age of Complete Inter- Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 527, 529-33 (1999); and
Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Social Ideology as Seen Through Courtroom and Courthouse Architecture, 22
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 463 (1998).
175. Two additional, secondary purposes that government buildings attempt to further,
which this Article does not discuss, are the broader sense of community and social capital
they can create in dense urban locations, seeJANEJACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES 179-86 (1961), and their ability to help deter criminal activity, see Neal
Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, Ill YALE LJ. 1039 (2002). Neither purpose
directly furthers public access, while efforts to achieve them may in fact limit the state's
visibility.
176. See CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE AMERICAN STATEHOUSE: INTERPRETING
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announce the state's existence'77 and indicate its occupant or occupants'
relative prominence.178 In doing so it may invite the polis to enter or
intimidate them and discourage their entry. 179 The interior design and
features of public buildings can also communicate openness or its opposite
as they either foster or inhibit interaction among government actors and
between the state and the public. 8 Public architectural design may
consider the public visibility of and access to government officials' work as a
significant end, but it may not.
Transparency laws must therefore attempt to address and mitigate the
physical obstructions that walls and ceilings place before the public's ability
to view and access state operations. They can succeed, at least to an extent.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires that public
buildings, and public accommodations generally, be "readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities,"' 8 is one notable example. The
ADA has significantly improved access to government offices and officials
DEMOCRACY'S TEMPLES 3-4, 15-34 (2001) (discussing statehouse architecture's
expressiveness and the historical evolution of architectural styles); AMos RAPOPORT, THE
MEANING OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 55-56 (1982) (discussing nonverbal communication
in architecture).
177. SeeJody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 572
(2000) (noting that an agency's headquarters announces its existence to the world as a
coherent, material entity).
178. See, eg., Ed Gibson, Tales of Two Cities: The Administrative Facade of Social Security, 35
ADMIN. & Soc'Y 408 (2003) (chronicling the location and architecture of the buildings
housing the Social Security Administration).
179. See LASSWELL, supra note 174, at 16-17 (contrasting how public architecture in
popular democratic and autocratic regimes communicates thee regimes' relationships with
their respective publics). Compare Arthur Goldberg, An Inside Perspective on the 1962 Guiding
Piinczples for Federal Architecture, DESIGN Q, No. 94/95, 1975, at 16, 16-17 (describing
"Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture," an influential federal report which advocated
that architects and officials emphasize the aesthetic qualities of public buildings and draw
the public into the "public parts" of government buildings through artwork and
architecture), with Richard Briffault, Facing the Urban Future Ajler September 11, 2001, 34 URB.
LAW. 563, 568-69 (2002) (describing how efforts to enhance the security of government
buildings after the 9/11 and Oklahoma City terrorist attacks have limited public access to
them), and Edward H. Ziegler, American Cities and Sustainable Development in the Age of Global
Terrorism Some Thoughts on Fortress America and the Potential for Defensive Dispersal I, 30 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 139 (2005). See also Charles T. Goodsell, Bureaucracy's
House in the Polis: Seeking an Appropriate Presence, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 393, 396-
407 (1997) (complaining that government building design in the 1970s led to massive
structures that fail to take seriously their role in housing democratically accountable entities).
180. Dvora Yanow, Built Space as Story: The Policy Stories That Buildings Tell, 23 POL'Y
STUD. J. 407, 417-19 (1995) (explaining how buildings tell "policy stories" to multiple
audiences through their design).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2006).
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for a population that previously faced barriers to enter public buildings.
Open government laws attempt to mitigate the enclosure problem for
the entire public in two primary ways: under the aegis of so-called "open
meeting" or "sunshine" laws, government officials are required to make
certain meetings accessible for public viewing, while open records laws
(including the FOIA and its state analogues) require that agencies open
their files to members of the public. In addition, video recordings and
broadcast of government meetings via C-SPAN and state and local cable
television and webcasting channels make otherwise public meetings more
widely available. None of these efforts provide unlimited physical or visual
access to all public buildings and offices at all times, however. As the next
section explains, such transparency that they do provide is limited, either as
a legal or practical matter, to certain preplanned public events or to files
over which the government has initial control. The physical enclosure that
walls and ceilings provide almost inevitably offer cover for the state from
the public's gaze, and transparency obligations cannot fully overcome or
compensate for enclosure's distance.
C. The Impossibility of Containment
The state's geography and built environment thus pose significant
barriers to government visibility and accessibility. Unsurprisingly,
legislatures and courts struggle with these issues, and it proves difficult to
shine light on the government and to free its information, especially when
officials and documents refuse to stand still across the state's vast territory
and public employees work within their offices or other interior spaces
where their actions cannot so easily be viewed. As ever, the law can handle
easy cases-most government documents are in fact housed in government
offices and can be requested and found, while official meetings regularly
occur in official meeting halls with public access. But more difficult cases-
private documents that are held in government offices or government
documents that are held in private spaces, or public officials' interactions in
private locations outside formal meeting halls and government offices-test
the limits of open government laws and challenge efforts to force
compliance with the symbolic dimensions of transparency.
1. Containing Meetings
Although the constitutional framers met behind closed doors, in
chambers (presumably) limited in sunlight though surely not infected,
federal and state legislatures have long allowed the public to view their
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formal meetings, whether by constitution or custom. 182  Modern,
comprehensive open meeting laws emerged in the states largely during the
post-World War II period, and especially in response to revelations of the
Nixon Administration's abuses of power (when Congress enacted the
Government in the Sunshine Act).' 83  These laws extended the openness
obligation to administrative bodies and local governments. Current
statutory and state constitutional laws, frequently named "sunshine" laws
(like the federal Act), require such meetings to be open and accessible to the
public, 84 thus echoing transparency's broader emphasis on visibility and
presence, as do the court decisions interpreting them.'8 5
The public is not invited to view everything the government does,
however. By definition, the only event that these laws make thoroughly
visible is the official occasion of a "meeting," 86 a term whose meaning is
182. HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 180-84 (1953); JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR
SECRECY 9-16 (1956).
183. ANN TAYLOR SCHWING WITH CONSTANCE TAYLOR, OPEN MEETING LAWs 2D
§ 1.1 (2000); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fghts for the "Right to Know," 75 HARv. L.
REv. 1199, 1199-1200(1962).
184. The federal open meeting statute is called the "Government in the Sunshine Act."
Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)).
Analogous state laws are frequently referred to similarly. See Sandra F. Chance & Christina
Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model for Implementing New
Technologies Consistent with Florida's Position as a Leader in Open Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
245, 245 & n. 1 (2008) (explaining that all of Florida's open government laws are popularly
referred to as "Sunshine Laws"); My Florida Sunshine-The "Sunshine" Law,
http://www.myflsunshine.com/sun.nsf/pages/Law (summarizing Florida's open
government laws) (last visited Aug. 5, 2010); see also MICH. COMP. LAws SERv. § 15.263(1)
(LexisNexis 2009) (state Open Meetings Act, declaring that "[a]ll meetings of a public
body ... shall be held in a place available to the general public.").
185. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 808, 826 (Cal. 1999)
(Brown,J., concurring) ("There is rarely any purpose to a nonpublic premeeting conference
except to conduct some part of the decisional process behind closed doors."); Town of Palm
Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974) (declaring that Florida's "government in
the sunshine law" barred instances when a city engages in its "decisional process behind
closed doors"); AtlantaJournal v. Hill, 359 S.E.2d 913, 914 (Ga. 1987) (describing Georgia's
Open Meetings Act as intended "to protect the public-both individuals and the public
generally-from 'closed door' politics"); Okla. Ass'n of Mun. Att'ys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310,
1313-14 (Okla. 1978) ("If an informed citizenry is to meaningfully participate in
government or at least understand why government acts affecting their daily lives are taken,
the process of decision making as well as the end results must be conducted in full view of
the governed.").
186. See, e.g, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (defining meeting as "the deliberations of at least the
number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency where
such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency
business").
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not self-evident.187 How far along in a decisionmaking body's consideration
of a matter does a gathering of its members constitute an official
meeting?'8 8 Does an open meeting mandate apply only to the formal
conferences that officials hold in an agency's official meeting space, or does
the definition of meeting extend outside the official enclosure, to other rooms
in government buildings, or even to gatherings and encounters held in
restaurants and homes? And if the latter, more capacious definition
applies, can officials be required to provide notice and public access to
informal meetings that occur by chance or appointment-in which case,
such meetings cannot as a practical matter take place within the ambit of
the law? Do the government's operations and transparency's reach extend
infinitely across the territories that its officials travel?
Consider the following case. Two elected members of a collegial body
(e.g., a local legislature or hospital board) spontaneously decide to dine
together with the general manager of a public agency overseen by the body.
The two elected members alone do not constitute a quorum of the body,
and they had no intent to circumvent the statutory open meeting
requirement in the relevant state. 89 Nevertheless, at dinner they could
discuss matters that are currently before the body or that could conceivably
come before the body at a later date, while the public would be unable to
monitor the conversation or even know the conversation took place. Is this
a meeting that would require the members to give advance notice of their
meal and to invite the public to join them?
Most open meeting statutes reach only formal meetings, defined as those
that would adopt final actions, or at which a majority or quorum is in
attendance.19 0 This approach assumes that a meeting occurs in the normal
course of a government entity's operations, at a scheduled time, most
187. SCHWING, supra note 183, § 6.6 (discussing various definitions of meeting in open
meeting law, and describing it as "[t]he most telling single element to determine whether an
open meeting act is strong and encompassing or weak and limited in scope").
188. See David A. Barrett, Note, Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing
Between Meetings and Nonmeetings Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1205-06
(1988) (distinguishing among stages in which a body is engaged in "collective inquiry" into
the existence of and facts surrounding an issue, deliberation over a narrow range of
proposals, or when the officials are deciding about a particular proposal).
189. This hypothetical case is based on two actual cases that did not result in reported
decisions. See Joseph W. Little & Thomas Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View,
53 N.C. L. REv. 451, 452 n.5 (1975); Peter H. Seed, Florida's Sunshine Law: The Undecided Legal
Issue, 13 U. FIA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 212-13 (2002).
190. Elizabeth Johnson Wallmeyer, Open Meeting Laws: A Comparison of the Fifty
States and the District of Columbia 60-62 (2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Florida) (on file with author) (noting that thirty of forty-two states whose open meeting laws
define meeting require either a quorum or majority of members).
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typically though not necessarily in the entity's office or in an official public
meeting room. 19 1 Therefore, the majority of jurisdictions would allow the
dinner meeting to take place without public notice or access because of its
small size and the informal nature of the gathering, even if it results in a
discussion by the members of an issue before the body. A small number of
jurisdictions would bar the meeting, however. Interpreting their state
statute, Florida courts and attorney general opinions would view the case as
a violation of Florida's sunshine law unless the public is provided notice and
access; to do otherwise, an intermediate appellate court has held, would
allow members to "gather with impunity behind closed doors and discuss
matters on which foreseeable action may be taken by that board or
commission in clear violation of the purpose, intent, and spirit of the
Government in the Sunshine Law."' 92
The issue maps the spatial and architectural problems the state creates
onto the private lives and dual identities of public officials who are at once
government officers and private individuals. Any space an official occupies,
even a private restaurant, can be transformed into a government office and
meeting room by virtue of the official's discussion of public business with
colleagues.193 A populist understanding of transparency would not allow
officials to avoid their duty to be visible to the public by escaping into their
private lives and identities because, as a California appellate court asserted,
191. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1(a)(2) (2009) (defining meeting as a "gathering of a
quorum of the members ... at a designated time and place" to discuss or take action on
official business); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.10(d) (2009) (defining meeting as "a meeting,
assembly, or gathering together at any time or place . .. of a majority of the members of a
public body for the purpose of conducting hearings, participating in deliberations, or voting
upon or otherwise transacting the public business within the jurisdiction, real or apparent, of
the public body").
192. Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); see also Fla.
Op. Att'y Gen. 2000-08 (2000), http://myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/
EDBA5F9E248932DA8525688000523870 (opining that the Sunshine Law "is generally
applicable to any gathering where two or more members of a public board or commission
discuss some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by that board or commission,"
including a forum for all county fire commissioners where on some occasions more than one
commissioner from a specific district may attend the same meeting). For an extended
critique of this approach to Florida's law arguing that it is inconsistent with the statute's text
and legislative history, see Seed, supra note 189. Other states take a similar approach. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (2008) (defining meeting to include the "informal assemblage
of (i) as many as three members or (ii) a quorum, if less than three, of the constituent
membership"); Mayor of El Dorado v. El Dorado Broad. Co., 544 S.W.2d 206, 207-08
(Ark. 1976) (holding that state Freedom of the Information Act applies to informal meetings
of less than a quorum of members).
193. See SCHWING, supra note 183, § 5.74 (discussing how state open meeting laws
consider the public or private character of the government's meeting place).
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"[a]n informal conference or caucus permits crystallization of secret
decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance." 94 If an official
can conduct public business out of the public's sight, and public business
includes nearly any action that could lead to an official government act,
then any enclosure and any space that the official occupies must be made
open to the public when necessary. Understood this way, the state can be
everywhere, and the public must be able to view its officials everywhere
across the state's territory and in any building where the public's business
takes place. Taken to its logical end, however, this view would allow no
space that an official occupies to be securely private-including his or her
home (from where the official can make calls and send e-mails via private
phone lines, computers, and e-mail accounts).195 The fact that federal law
and the vast majority of states refuse to extend their open meeting laws to
this degree suggests that legislatures and courts have been hesitant to make
the state thoroughly and constantly visible. Their unwillingness to adopt
the populist approach suggests either a failure of will or a recognition that
the state's visibility can and should be sacrificed to other interests, including
the practical limits of transparency's enforcement and the private interests
of public officials.
2. Containing Documents
Government agencies regularly possess in their facilities documents they
did not create; conversely, records produced by the government frequently
end up in the hands of individuals and institutions and are housed in
buildings that are not themselves part of the government. Open
government laws struggle to resolve the issue of whether an agency must
disclose a record that it does not possess, and whether it should be required
to release a record that it possesses but that originated with another part of
the government. Do freedom of information statutes cover records that are
not in government offices or on government property? Can they tame the
tendency of documents to move across the government and into the file
194. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 50 (Ct. App. 1968).
195. See Goodson Todman Enter., Ltd. v. City of Kingston Common Council, 550
N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that a meeting in a council member's home
can be subject to open meeting law if it is planned and relates to government business);
Stephen Schaeffer, Comment, Sunshine in Cyberspace? Electronic Deliberation and the Reach of Open
Meeting Laws, 48 ST. Louis U. LJ. 755, 761-64 (2004) (discussing the application of open
meetings laws to telephone and video conferences); Mark Thompson, Comment, Opening
Virtual Doors: Addressing Ohio's Open Meeting Law and the Use of Electronic Communication, 34 U.




cabinets (and hard drives) of private individuals? Under the FOIA, the
issue turns on whether a document is an "agency record," which the statute
fails to define, and whether an agency has the duty to obtain and retain
records, which the statute fails to specify.
The answer, according to the Supreme Court, is that to be subject to
disclosure under the FOIA, a record must either be born governmental-it
must have, as its provenance, a governmental pedigree-or be adopted by
the government-that is, the government must willingly take possession of
it.196 This definition has a spatial dimension to it: the record must be
produced within the government's domain, or later incorporated within it.
Consider, for example, the case of Henry Kissinger's telephone notes.197
Kissinger served as both National Security Advisor (from 1969 until 1975)
and Secretary of State (between 1973 and 1977) under Presidents Nixon
and Ford. Throughout his service, he regularly recorded his telephone
conversations, and the resulting tapes were then transcribed and stored in
documentary form in his personal files within the Department of State.198
In October 1976, after obtaining a legal opinion from the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State concluding that the transcribed notes constituted
personal papers rather than agency records and were therefore his to keep
after he left office,, Secretary Kissinger arranged to remove the files to the
private estate of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.'99  By a later
agreement, Kissinger deeded the notes to the Library of Congress with
restrictions on public access to the materials prior to the death of the parties
to the phone conversations. 200 When journalists and public interest groups
subsequently filed requests to view the documents, the Department of State
claimed that it no longer had possession of the files. 20'
The issue before the Court in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, as Justice Brennan highlighted in his dissent, was the extent to
which the FOIA restrains an agency's authority to move documents-
especially if a requester claims that the agency intended the documents'
removal to make them inaccessible-and the effect that physical location
196. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144-46 (1989). Note that
this only speaks to the question of whether a record was improperly withheld, not to the
question of whether it is an "agency record" subject to the FOIA. The latter issue is
complicated by the organizational question of which entities are in fact subject to the FOIA,
an issued discussed supra Part II.B.
197. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
198. Id. at 140.
199. Id. at 140-41.
200. Id. at 141-42.
201. Id. at 142-43. Some of the requests were filed before the files' removal. Id.
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has on their public access.202 If the FOIA extends only to physical control
by and within the state's facilities, and the law does not require an agency
to disclose all of the records it considered in its decisionmaking process (no
matter if the agency ever gained possession of them),203 then a document's
location outside of the state not only matters but is outcome
determinative-a document not within the state's control cannot be made
available under the FOIA. A majority of the Supreme Court took this
more limited approach to the issue in Kissinger, holding that a document
that an agency does not possess has not been "withheld" under the
FOIA.204 If an agency does not possess a document, even if it has allowed
the document to leave its possession, then its failure to retrieve it does not
violate the law. 205 Because Secretary Kissinger's telephone records were no
longer housed within Department of State offices and under the agency's
control, the Department of State did not violate the FOIA by failing to
release them. 206 To be an agency record, a document must be physically
located within the state.207
The reverse situation creates what appears to be an odd result that
further confounds the populist understanding of transparency. Just as
documents created but not retained by an agency are no longer subject to
the FOIA when they leave the agency's control, so documents controlled by
an agency that is subject to the FOIA but created by a public or private
entity that is not subject to the FOIA are also not subject to the FOIA.
Thus, in Kissinger, files that Kissinger created while he was a close advisor to
the President (a role that does not fall within the FOIA's ambit)208 and
before he became Secretary of State (when documents he created would fall
within the FOIA) did not become Department of State records when they
202. Id. at 159 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (1980) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
204. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 150-51.
205. Part of this limitation emanates from the FOIA's limited reach. It does not require
an agency to create or retain records; instead, the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-
2910 (2006), and the Records Disposal Act, id. §§ 3301-3324, govern how records are
managed and disposed of, and neither statute provides for a private right of action. The
FOIA thus does not itself obligate an agency to retrieve a document that it allowed to leave
its possession. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 148-50.
206. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 155.
207. A companion case to Kissinger, decided by the Court on the same day, came to a
similar conclusion, holding that medical records produced by a private research
organization under the aegis and with the funding of a federal agency are not subject to the
FOIA because they were neither made nor received by a federal agency. Forsham, 445 U.S.
at 186.
208. See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156.
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were moved to his new office. 209  Similarly, the record of a secret
congressional committee hearing did not become an agency record because
it was possessed by the CIA; rather, it remained within congressional
control and was thus not subject to the FOIA, even if it was housed within
the CIA's facilities. 210 The D.C. Circuit's current test for these types of
cases, a two-part standard to determine whether documents created either
by or for Congress but in an agency's possession constitute agency records,
inquires into whether Congress has in fact ceded control of the documents
and whether the agency has gained over them full property rights, rather
than simple possessory interests.21'
Kssinger's result is the exact opposite of what an open government law
that embraces the full implications of transparency would expect and
demand.212 A document located outside the state, Kissinger held, is not
subject to the FOIA. But a document located within the state is also not
necessarily subject to the FOIA. If the state created it or controls it, a
populist understanding of transparency would argue the document ought to
be made available to the public. The state's organizational and physical
complexity should not keep it from being visible. The present state of the
law appears to allow the government and its officials to move documents
209. Id. at 157.
210. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 607
F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 347. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding records created by IRS for the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation
were agency records because, other than in its initial request, Congress failed to show
sufficient intent to retain control over them); Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 695-96 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), vacated in part on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ( holding
records created by the CIA to aid a congressional investigation were agency records subject
to the FOIA because Congress did not manifest sufficient intent to retain control over them);
Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838, 842-43
(D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated in part on other grounds, 455 U.S. 997 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that
documents created by the CIA for Congress, which were sent to Congress and then returned
to the CIA, constituted agency records subject to the FOIA because Congress failed to retain
control over them).
212. See, e.g., Feiser, supra note 153, at 58 (criticizing Kissinger's approach as "cramped"
and arguing that "this approach would keep its records out of the public eye unless the
FOIA agency actually possesses and uses the documents"); Samaha, supra note 5, at 971-72
(criticizing Kissinger as exemplifying one of the FOIA's main weaknesses: the ability of the
government to avoid accountability to the public by moving or destroying documents); The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Freedom of Information Act: Threshold Definitional Barriers to Disclosure,
94 HARv. L. REv. 232, 240 (1980) (characterizing Kissinger's limited reading of the FOIA as
"unsatisfactory"); Marie Veronica O'Connell, Note, A Control Test for Determining "Agency
Record" Status Under the Freedom of Information Act, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 611, 628-29 (1985)
(attempting to read Kissinger broadly as part of a "control" theory that would make
possession a non-determinative test for the FOIA's applicability).
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around its offices and territory in order to avoid disclosure.
D. The Impossibility of Physical Exposure
Geography and the built environment help define the state's reach and
presence. The American state encompasses a huge territory, and in its
branches and levels occupies a vast number of buildings. Insofar as the
state and its administrative apparatus have solidified their position at the
core of an expansive and complex nation, their material scope and
existence will continue to prove difficult to contain in a manner that will
render them fully visible.
CONCLUSION: THE PANOPTICIZED STATE
The metaphoric understanding of transparency, which defines the
accessible, accountable government as one that can be seen, faces
innumerable obstacles in the complex and dispersed American state.
Technology can ameliorate but not remove such obstacles, notwithstanding
constructive efforts to improve the release and usefulness of government
data-and then to claim those improvements as technological fixes to a
secretive, likely corrupt state. 213 Like the ongoing quest for legal and
regulatory solutions to the problem of government opacity and
unsatisfactory performance, the ongoing quest for technological fixes that
make the state more accountable is itself symptomatic of the populist
embrace of the visible state ideal. Information technology can make the
state more visible, which will in turn force government officers to behave in
ways that better comport with citizens' expectations. If we cannot see the
physical state, and if we cannot thoroughly force the state to be seen
through law, perhaps we can see a digital one-or at least its informational
traces-on the Internet or through a spreadsheet.
These efforts call to mind another technological fix for a significant social
problem that requires the surveillance of a set of dangerously wayward
actors. In all of its guises, the transparency metaphor urges the
construction of an inverted panoptic penal facility, one that puts the
public-or some subset thereof-in the position of the guard and that casts
government officials as the incarcerated. Jeremy Bentham's original design
213. See, e.g., David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALEJ.L. &
TECH. 160, 160 (2009) (claiming that the government should release reusable, rather than
processed, data, which would "embrace the potential of Internet-enabled government
transparency"); Sunlight Foundation, supra note 26 (characterizing itself as using "cutting-
edge technology and ideas to make government transparent and accountable . . . [by]
focus[ing] on the digitization of government data and the creation of tools and Web sites to
make that data easily accessible for all citizens").
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for his Panopticon arranged and illuminated cells so that the inmates would
be constantly visible to prison guards located securely in a central tower.
Prisoners could see the tower but could not see into it, and could constantly
be seen, despite being confined to a cell from which they could not
escape. 214 The prison's enclosure would illuminate them, removing the
darkness that offered them protection while it captured them for the
supervisor's eye. The Panopticon thus makes its subjects transparent to
authority.
For the Panopticon's effect to reach its "[i]deal perfection," Bentham
asserted, the subject should be unable to recognize when he is being
watched, but should at all times "conceive himself to be so" scrutinized.2 15
Constant and unending, the belief that one is being watched would prove
self-regulating as it was internalized by the prisoner; it would thereby be less
difficult and costly to impose, and would require fewer guards to
administer.216  The architecture of the Panopticon that creates the
conditions of feeling under constant surveillance thereby shapes the
prisoner and causes him to learn to shape himself, rendering through its
physical design and organization a subject who considers himself to be the
object of permanent surveillance. Such surveillance does not merely
disincentivize resistance or thwart escape-it disciplines and organizes the
behavior, thought, and desire of the surveilled. As Michel Foucault noted,
Bentham brilliantly recognized that "[v]isibility is a trap." 217 Rather than
an old-fashioned institution of power that banished certain undesirable
activities and people-the criminal, the sick, the insane-the Panopticon
could "carry the effects of power right to them" through "the calculation of
openings, of filled and empty spaces, passages and transparencies." 218 It
offers an architecture of "continuous observation made possible by
technical arrangements." 219
For Bentham, the panoptic model had clear implications for
representative democracy. Throughout his political writings, Bentham
214. JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon: Or, The Inspection-House, &c, in IV THE VORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 40, 44 (John Bowring ed., 1843). The best recent legal academic
summaries and treatments of Bentham's Panopticon are Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on
the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 357-61 (1998); and Katyal,
supra note 175, at 1130-32.
215. BENTHAM, supra note 214, at 40.
216. Id
217. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
218. Id. at 172.
219. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE 322 (1988).
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emphasized the importance of allowing the public to view its political
rulers. Publicity, he argued, would "constrain" the ruling assembly to
perform its duty, allow it to secure the confidence of its public, and develop
a more informed electorate. 220 Bentham imagined mechanisms to achieve
a state that was constantly under scrutiny, particularly through the concept
of the "Public Opinion Tribunal," a kind of societal committee or judiciary
of the whole that would play a key role in a constitutional democracy.
Specifically, it would gather facts and evidence regarding the performance
of public institutions; express approval or disapproval of the state, as well as
reward or punish representatives and officials; and propose reforms and
new institutional arrangements. 22 1 In this regard, his Tribunal, and his
general understanding of publicity, imagined the public's check on
government behavior as analogous to the Panopticon, in which the
informed, collectively organized public "attempts to serve as the all-seeing
eye, casting its critical reforming gaze over the full spectrum of
governmental (indeed public) activity." 222  For Bentham, democracy's
foundation was built on the panoptic principle of an ever-vigilant public
managing a captive state and rulers.223
As with Bentham's Panopticon, the populist metaphorical conception of
transparency views its objects-government institutions and officers, rather
than incarcerated prisoners-as requiring discipline. Both long to provide
an institutional solution to the problem they identify, one that can develop
in their objects the self-discipline that will transform them into proper
subjects: rehabilitated citizens for Bentham, a more responsive and
responsible state for transparency advocates. Strong-form transparency
thus would reverse the Panopticon, placing the people in the lookout and
recasting the state as the object of surveillance. The sentiment is populist,
but the institutional apparatus that would enact the sentiment is decidedly
progressive: a solution to a significant social problem that works through a
state institution intended to shape human behavior.
The fly in transparency's ointment is the same one that Bentham faced.
As a practical matter, building a Panopticon proves difficult. Bentham
could not persuade the various relevant authorities of his time-late
220. JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29-34 (MichaelJames et al. eds., 1999).
221. See FREDERICK RoSEN,JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 27-
28 (1983).
222. Id. at 111; see also JANET SEMPLE, BENTHAM'S PRISON 321 (1993) ("Bentham's
democracy is a structure full of light, as was the panopticon, but the light falls on those in
authority.").
223. Alan McKinlay & Ken Starkey, Managing Foucault: Foucault, Management and
Organization Theory, in FOUCAULT, MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 1, 3-4 (Alan
McKinlay & Ken Starkey eds., 1998).
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century prison administrators, political
leadership, and landowners-to allow him to build his model prison.2 24
Instead, the Panopticon has come to stand as what Foucault calls a
"program" rather than a material, historical fact: one of the "diverse
realities articulated onto each other" that produces a series of wide-ranging
effects throughout society; most importantly, these technologies "crystallize
into institutions, they inform individual behavior, they act as grids for the
perception and evaluation of things." 225  The Panopticon serves as a
metaphor for the modem institution, one that seeks to discipline its subjects
by forcing them to internalize external authority, to develop the discipline
of the self. It also represents the madness and excess of modernity, the
pernicious but essential means by which the state could develop as the apex
of the modem, rational civilization. It is impossible and horrifying to
imagine a world in which one is perpetually under threat of observation. 226
But it is also necessary as a metaphor to understand how the modern liberal
state develops its subjects, and unsurprising therefore that one of the great
liberal and utilitarian political philosophers-one whose writings on the
role of publicity in a representative constitutional democracy remain filled
with viable, relevant ideals-should have proposed it.
Viewing the boundless and endless desire to achieve a visible state in
relation to the panopticized state model leads to two related conclusions.
First, because the state cannot be made wholly visible, short of dismantling
it or imposing a maddening (and likely impossible to construct) panoptic
apparatus, such a desire will lead only to cycles of frustration. The popular
will to see the state will ride an asymptotic line that approaches-but never
reaches-the perfect and perfectly accountable and responsive government.
Second, the will to see the state is so much a part of American democratic,
populist political culture that is skeptical of the state that it cannot itself be
wished away. 227  Technocratic reform to provide incremental
224. SEMPLE, supra note 222, at 192-28 1.
225. 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, EsSENTIAL WORKS: POWER 232 (James D. Faubion ed.,
2000).
226. It is unsurprising, therefore, that writers decrying public and private surveillance
use the Panopticon as a metaphor for contemporary society. See, e.g., REG WHITAKER, THE
END OF PRIvAcY 32-46 (1999) (describing the Panopticon as a model for contemporary
society). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 181, 184-86 (2008) (noting the prevalence of the Panopticon in academic discussions
of surveillance and privacy).
227. 1 am for this reason skeptical of Edward Rubin's efforts to purge political concepts
of their popular and (what he sees as therefore) unhelpful resonances with historical
references to a long-vanished state and ideological misrecognitions of the current one by
employing uninteresting, uninformative, and naive heuristics. See RUBIN, supra note 50, at
16-17. As the legal realist Thurman Arnold argued regarding the conservative opposition
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improvements to government performance-including but not limited to
making government more open to the public-can neither ignore nor
counteract populist demands for a fully visible state. Successful legislative,
regulatory, and institutional interventions must recognize and respect the
desire for a visible state while they also concede and grapple with the state's
inevitable push towards opacity. In the struggle over transparency, the
populist will and the technocratic will cannot be separated.
to New Deal reform, which frequently expressed itself in legal formalist terms that attempted
to thwart the administrative state, "[s]o long as our belief in rational moral government
depends upon the law, it must continue to balance logically the contradictory ideals which
that government must express." THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
69 (5th prtg. 1948). In other words, incremental reform that appears to be a substitute for a
new age of transparency must nevertheless present itself as the next important step toward
the dawn of a full transparency that can never be achieved.
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